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THE POLITICAL  and  intellectual  leaders  of Eastern  Europe's  revolution  of 
1989  describe their aim as a "return  to Europe." Their overwhelming 
judgment  is that  the postwar  division  of Europe  into East and  West was 
artificially  imposed by the Soviet Union, at enormous human and 
economic cost.  They underscore the artificiality  of the division by 
referring  to their region as East Central  Europe (or Middle Europe), 
rather  than Eastern Europe, thereby stressing  their countries' place in 
the mainstream  of European  history, politics, arts, and economy. 
The  policy  dimension  of the return  to Europe  is the creation  of political 
and  economic  institutions  in the style of Western  Europe.  I  In this spirit, 
these countries are directed toward the creation of multiparty  parlia- 
mentary  democracies  and  market  economies with large  private  sectors.2 
1. The  degree  of consensus  in Eastern  Europe  in favor  of establishing  a Western-style 
market  economy certainly  exceeds the levels of consensus found in Latin America  and 
other  parts  of the  developing  world.  In  many  Latin  American  countries,  such  as Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Peru,  there  are still fundamental  battles  (even violent  war  in the case of Peru) 
about  the kind  of society and economy to which the nation  should  aspire. Of course, as 
the  abstract  idea  of a market  economy  is put  into practice  and  the pressures  of adjustment 
grow,  we will  find  out whether  today's consensus  survives.  We believe that  it will, largely 
because  of the overwhelming  attraction  of the Western  European  example. 
2. Of  course,  even Western  Europe  offers  a wide  array  of alternative  economic  models 
from which to choose, but in practical  terms there is little reason yet for the Eastern 
European  countries  to choose among  the  variants  of Western  European  political  economy. 
Before such choices have to be made, Eastern  Europe should work hard  to create the 
common  core of market  institutions  found in all of Western  Europe:  private  ownership 
protected  by a commercial  law, a corporate  structure  for  industry,  an  independent  financial 
system,  and  so forth. 
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With  amazing  rapidity,  the  postcommunist  politicians  of Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia,  and  Hungary  have dropped  any support  for  an  economic "third 
way"-that  is,  some form of market socialism-and  seem intent on 
moving instead to a full-fledged market economy based on private 
property.3  So far in 1990, political majorities  in East Germany and 
Hungary  have strongly  rejected  political  currents  linked  to a continuation 
of socialism.4 
The intense  desire  to rejoin  the economies  of Western  Europe  reflects 
both an attraction  to the obvious achievements  of Western  Europe  and 
a revulsion against  the failures  under  communism.  The low per capita 
incomes in Eastern  Europe  do not fully explain the pervasive sense of 
frustration  in the region.  It is one thing  to be poor, but it is quite  another 
to have become impoverished  needlessly as a result  of the failure  of the 
communist  system. It is the sense of unnecessary  decay, as much  as the 
deprivation  itself, that  motivates  the impulse  toward  change.5 
The postcommunist  democratic  governments  will begin, in 1990, a 
process of comprehensive change aimed at the creation of market 
economies. Each government  will face questions about the content of 
3. At the same time, the new governments  have intensified  their  diplomatic  contact 
with  Western  European  governments,  regional  institutions,  and  the international  financial 
institutions  to press for a close political and economic relationship.  Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary,  Poland,  and  Yugoslavia  have appealed  for new, intensive  relationships  with  the 
Council of Europe, the European Community,  and the Organization  for Economic 
Cooperation  and Development.  The voters in East Germany  went further,  putting  their 
electoral  support  in the March  1990  election  behind  the alliance  opting  for the most rapid 
reunification  with  West  Germany. 
4.  Even the social democratic  parties,  considered  just six months  ago to represent  the 
likely dominant  political  force in democratic  regimes,  have fared  very poorly. 
5. Solidarity's  leading  political  theorist,  Adam  Michnik,  has raised  the issue of why 
even committed  communists  have been ready to turn their backs on the old system. 
Michnik's  answer  is that  the collapse  of living  standards  has been universal,  affecting  even 
the highest levels of the party. He summarizes  this collapse as the "Doctrine of the 
Radiators,"  recently  described  in a speech  at the University  of Michigan. 
"Three years ago all of the heaters [radiators]  stopped working," said Michnik. 
Shivering  in his apartment  he thought  that  at least  the Party  officials  were  warm  in their 
dachas. Then  he met the wife of the former  Polish  premier  at a friend's  wedding.  She 
was shivering.  "Why are you cold?" he asked. She said "My husband  is sitting  at 
home  wearing  the fur  hat  given  to him  by Kosygin.  " The country's  heaters  were on "a 
permanent  strike." 
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market  reforms,  the pace of change, the sequence of change, and the 
design  of international  assistance in support  of comprehensive  change. 
The strategy  for change  must  take into account  the specific  historical 
circumstances  of Eastern  Europe  as of 1990.  Lessons from  other  regions 
and other periods are vital to an understanding  of the likely economic 
consequences  of possible  actions,  but  for  important  reasons,  the Eastern 
Europe  context suggests  a special  course  of action. In particular,  a rapid 
transition  to a market  economy, with a heavy emphasis on economic 
integration  with Western  Europe-through free trade, active participa- 
tion of foreign  firms  in the domestic  economy, and  closer political  ties- 
will permit  the Eastern European  economies to overcome some of the 
thorniest  problems  of transition,  both economic and  political.6 
To demonstrate  this point, we will focus most of our discussion on 
Poland.  The case of Poland  is particularly  instructive,  not only because 
Poland  is Eastern  Europe's  largest  economy and most populous  nation, 
but also because it is the first country to embark  on a program  of fun- 
damental  market  reform  under a noncommunist  government. In Sep- 
tember 1989,  the Solidarity-led  government  of Prime  Minister  Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki came into office. On January 1, 1990, the government 
introduced  a program  of radical  reform,  designed  by the economic team 
headed  by Deputy Prime  Minister  Leszek Balcerowicz. The aim  was to 
end Poland's hyperinflation  and create the legal, institutional, and 
economic  basis for a market  economy. Though  the program  is only three 
months old, and it is therefore far too early to make any definitive 
judgments,  early  lessons from  Poland  are  relevant  for  the other  countries 
in the region. 
In our analysis  of Eastern  Europe's transition  to a market  economy, 
we proceed in two parts. First, we summarize  the prevailing  economic 
and  political  conditions  in Eastern  Europe,  which constitute  the starting 
point for the transition  to a market  economy. Following  Janos Kornai, 
we focus at length  on the key role of shortages  in the socialist  economies 
and the implications  of shortages  for the transition  strategy.7  We also 
6. Many  of our  conclusions  concerning  the need  for  a rapid  and  dramatic  liberalization 
of the economy  run  parallel  to those of Janos  Kornai  in his recently  published  strategy  for 
economic transition  in Hungary, The Road to a Free Economy. We have benefited 
enormously  from  detailed  discussions  with  Professor  Kornai. 
7. See Kornai  (1980, 1982,  1986,  1989,  1990). 78  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1990 
outline  our  ideas  about  the basic strategy  for  a package  of comprehensive 
reforms.  Next, we narrow  our  focus to Poland,  describing  the conditions 
of the  Polish  economy, the strategy  of reform  that  was adopted  in Poland, 
the early results of the transition  program,  and the remaining  agenda. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications  of the Polish 
case for the rest of Eastern  Europe. 
Current Conditions in Eastern Europe 
Even with a consensus on the ultimate  aims of reform, the tactical 
difficulties  of creating a market  economy are profound. Fundamental 
social, political,  and  economic  changes  must  be carried  out in  the context 
of a deep and worsening economic crisis, inexperience in managing  a 
market  economy, fragile  political  institutions,  the residual  pressures  of 
the communist  power structure  throughout  society, the reemergence  of 
historical  enmities, and often very deep ethnic fissures. Moreover, the 
rapidly  worsening  economic crisis in the Soviet Union is producing  an 
economic fallout in Council  for Mutual  Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
trade, and the risks of further  instability  in the Soviet Union hang  like a 
pall over the region. 
Because  the  political  and  economic  conditions  in  the  various  countries 
differ  markedly,  the prospects  for success differ  as well. The prospects 
appear  to be brightest  in the most westward countries:  East Germany 
(where  the process will occur as part  of reunification),  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria and Romania, the 
conditions are considerably less  favorable, both economically and 
politically.  And despite  Gorbachev's  strong  orientation  toward  Western 
Europe,  the Soviet Union remains  a case by itself, where it is difficult  to 
find a national  consensus on almost any matter, including  a return  to 
Europe. 
The Tyranny of Misleading  Data 
Western  economists, accustomed  to Western standards  of analysis, 
sometimes  take  Eastern  European  data  at face value. The  data,  however, 
can be misleading  for several reasons. 
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some cases,  and collected on a very inadequate conceptual base in other 
cases.8  Real growth,  for example,  has been  routinely  overstated  and 
inflation routinely understated in the data of Eastern  Europe  and the 
Soviet Union. Second, and most emphatically, in a shortage economy- 
in which  goods  are not available  at official  prices-measures  of  real 
living standards (such as the wage deflated by the price index) are likely 
to contain a serious  upward bias.  In a market economy,  a fall in real 
wages  usually  means  a  drop  in  living  standards.  But  in  a  shortage 
economy,  a fall in real wages can simply mean the elimination of queues, 
and therefore a rise  in living standards. 
Third, almost  all analysts  of the  socialist  economies  recognize  the 
extreme  bias toward heavy  industry,  much of which produces  goods 
used by other heavy industry but without benefits-either  current or in 
the future-for  consumption.  This output is given an important weight 
in the production and GNP  accounts,  but it is of little true economic 
value. A Polish journalist recently put it well: 
For the entire  period  of real socialism, investments  were poured  into a closed 
production  circle  that  offered  no  profit:  coal  was necessary  to produce  electricity; 
electricity  was necessary  to produce  steel; and  steel was necessary  to mine  coal. 
All that  produced  a statistical  growth  in national  income, a growth  which, as we 
now see, actually  meant  a decline in national  wealth. Let us keep in mind  that 
the prices  for everything  were taken  out of thin  air.9 
It is bad enough that these  data problems pose  a serious barrier to 
analysis.  What  is  worse  is  that  the  data  can  provoke  unwarranted 
pressures on policymakers.  In the course of stabilization, for example, 
declines  in measured real wages  that will in fact  vastly  overstate  the 
actual economic  losses  can nonetheless  still generate  strong political 
demands for government-mandated  wage  increases  that could  under- 
mine the stabilization program itself. 
With these data problems in mind, let us outline the main constraints 
on  economic  reform that  face  every  government  in the  region.  We 
8. As Fallenbuchl  (1989)  describes,  the following  conceptual  problems  routinely  lead 
to an overestimation  of the rate  of growth  of net material  product  (a measure  of the value- 
added in production):  double counting  of inputs, inadequate  depreciation  allowances, 
inclusion  of wasted  materials,  and,  most  important,  an inadequate  account  of rising  prices 
in the deflation  of nominal  magnitudes.  For further  discussion  of data  inadequacies,  see 
Fallenbuchl  (1985);  Alton  (1989);  and  Fink  and  Havlik  (1989). 
9. Ernest  Skalski,  "The Idiot's Economy," Gazeta  International  '90, week 10, 1990, 
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mention  three categories:  the Stalinist  legacy, the economic crisis as of 
1990,  and the political  context, including  the international  political and 
economic  environment. 
The Stalinist Legacy 
The  countries  in Eastern  Europe  have a socialist  ownership  structure. 
Industrial  production  is typically 90 percent or more state owned; the 
service sector is also heavily state owned, though  an unknown  level of 
activity  takes  place in  the grey  or black  market.  10  Agriculture  is generally 
state owned and controlled, except in Poland, where farmers  retained 
their private land after World War II, though under highly restrictive 
and  repressive  conditions.11 
The role of central planning  as of 1990 differs considerably  among 
countries.  12 A summary  statistic  is the share  of goods subject  to central 
allocation by the central planning organs. By this measure, central 
planning  remained  in place until  this year in Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany,  and Romania.  Central  allocation  has been substantially 
phased  out in Hungary  and  was progressively  reduced  in scope in Poland 
during the  1980s. In these latter economies,  some portions of the 
economy, such as energy and trade with the Soviet Union, remained 
under  central  allocation  until  recently. 
As Kornai  has stressed, the shrinkage  of the sphere  of central  planning 
in Hungary  and  Poland  and  the growing  autonomy  of enterprises  did not 
mean the emergence  of normal  competitive  market  relations.13 Rather, 
10. In the case of Poland,  71 percent  of Polish  workers  are employed  in the socialized 
sector  (which  includes  state-owned  enterprises  and  cooperatives).  Most workers  outside 
the socialized  sector  are employed  in the predominantly  private  agricultural  sector. Even 
more striking,  88 percent of the measured  net material  product  in industry  (including 
construction)  and 86 percent  of industrial  employment  is in socialized enterprises.  (Of 
course,  these statistics  do not purport  to measure  black  market  economic  activity.) 
11. In Poland  private  farms  account  for 77 percent  of total arable  land  and  80 percent 
of output.  Nonetheless, the private  farm sector was greatly  circumscribed,  as all of its 
inputs  came from state enterprises  and all its outputs  had to be sold to the state. There 
were also restrictions  on sales of land, which prevented  a rationalization  of farm sizes 
following  prewar  land  reforms,  and  left the average  farm  a minuscule-and consequently 
inefficient-five hectares  in size. See Balcerowicz  (1989,  p. 43) for land  ownership  data. 
Output  figure  comes from  Rocznik  Statystyczny. 
12. For a comparative  discussion of the state of reforms  up to 1988  in the various 
countries,  see Vacic (1989). 
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under the process of communist-led  reform in Hungary and Poland, 
central  planning  was replaced  in part  by market-type  controls but also 
by a burgeoning  of ad hoc negotiations  between the enterprise  and the 
financial  authorities.  While in a nominal  sense enterprises  were guided 
by prices, interest  rates, and tax rates, rather  than  material  allocations, 
in practice  the prices, interest  rates, and taxes have all been the subject 
of continual  negotiation. 
State enterprises,  whether in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, almost 
inevitably  create  financial  problems  in  two main  areas  of decisionmaking: 
wages (where  they are prone to pay excessive wages out of the income 
stream  that would otherwise accrue to the Treasury)  and investment 
(where  the manager  has a craving  for investment  spending,  because he 
stands  to gain  from control  over a larger  firm,  but bears little or no cost 
if the investments  fail). Even in Western  Europe  the state sector has run 
into repeated  financial  difficulties,  and  in Latin  America  the state sector 
has contributed  significantly  to the genesis of the debt crisis. But the 
situation  in Eastern  Europe  is even more  grave, since the state sector is 
not disciplined  by being  part  of a larger  market  economy. To the extil 
that state enterprises  have been decontrolled,  but without introdu-. g 
real  market  competition  at the same time, the result  has been a worsen- 
ing of financial  indiscipline  of the firm  and, eventually, of the macro- 
economy.  14 
The state enterprise system does not rely on capital markets to 
allocate credit. Investment spending is typically negotiated between 
enterprises,  the relevant  government  ministries,  and  the central  planning 
commission.  Once  approved,  investments  are  paid  for  by various  reserve 
funds set aside by an enterprise, centrally allocated investment  funds 
from  the national  budget,  and  loans  from  the central  bank.  None of these 
funding  sources requires  an adequate  assessment of investment pros- 
pects. 
The countries of Eastern Europe differ in the extent to which the 
private  sector  has  been  permitted  to operate.  It has  been highly  restricted 
in Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, Romania,  and Yugoslavia. A very small 
private service sector survived the socialization  process in East Ger- 
many. A somewhat  larger  private sector has been allowed to operate 
under  the reforms  in Hungary  and Poland. But even in these last cases, 
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the private  firms  have been heavily  restricted  by administrative  barriers, 
punitive tax laws, shortages of inputs, and unavailability  of foreign 
exchange and credit, the allocation of which has been almost entirely 
directed  to the state sector. 
All the countries  suffer  from  heavily  distorted  relative  prices. Energy 
and  household  necessities (mainly  food and  rent)  are  heavily  subsidized. 
The exchange rate is overvalued, in the sense that foreign  exchange is 
rationed  at the official  price (both  for current  and capital  transactions), 
so that  the black market  exchange  rate  is heavily  depreciated  relative  to 
the official  rate. Therefore,  while import  prices measured  at the official 
exchange rate are cheap, most imported  goods are severely rationed  in 
supply (or simply not available), so that the effective price facing end 
users is extremely  high. 
On  a sectoral  level, the industrial  structure  in  every country  is strongly 
skewed toward heavy industry  and capital goods and away from light 
industry,  services, and consumer  goods. This emphasis  mainly  reflects 
two factors:  first,  the obsessive growth  orientation  of the Stalinist  model 
and, second, trade patterns  instituted  by the Soviet Union, which has 
induced the Eastern  European  countries  to develop large industries  to 
process Soviet raw  materials  and  then  reexport  them  to the Soviet Union 
in semifinished  or finished  form. 
In Poland,  for  example,  in 1987  the industrial  and  construction  sectors 
produced  52  percent  of GDP, compared  withjust  29  percent  to 38  percent 
in Greece, Portugal,  and Spain. By contrast, the growth  of the service 
sector in Poland  has been severely stunted  by the focus on industry.  In 
the same year the service sector in Poland  employed 35 percent of the 
labor  force, far  less than  in Greece, Spain, or Portugal  (see table 1). 
The organization  of industry  is designed to facilitate  top-down  plan- 
ning, rather  than market  competition,  with a heavy orientation  toward 
large  firms  integrated  both horizontally  and vertically.  There  is a virtual 
absence of small to medium-sized  firms,  with employment  between 50 
and 100, the kind of firm  that plays such a vital role in growth in the 
Western industrialized  economies.15 Part of this centralization  results 
from large-scale  production  units, and part  from the tendency to group 
separate  factories in a particular  sector together in a small number  of 
15. For a comparison  of the size of establishments  in socialist  countries  and  capitalist 
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Table  1. Real GDP  and Employment  by Sector,  Poland  and Selected 
Market  Economies,  1980-87 
Percent 
Average  Average 
Share in  annual  Share in total  annualchange 
total GDPa  change in  employment  in sector  Sector and  sector GDP,  employment, 
country  1980  1987  1980-87  1980  1987  1980-87 
Industry5 
Poland  42.6  41.7  0.4  30.1  28.5  -0.9 
Portugal  31.4  30.6  1.6  27.1  26.5  0.4 
Spain  29.7  29.1  2.0  27.1  24.2  -1.8 
Greece  26.1  25.1  2.3  20.7c  21.5  1.0 
Agr  iculture 
Poland  10.7  12.1  2.5  30.4  29.1  -0.8 
Portugal  7.0  7.8  3.7  27.3  21.9  - 2.3 
Spain  6.9  6.3  0.8  19.2  15.1  - 3.6 
Greece  14.5  12.9  -0.5  30.7c  27.0  -1.8 
Construction 
Poland  12.6  10.5  -1.9  7.7  7.8  0.0 
Portugal  6.1  5.5  0.5  9.5  9.3  0.4 
Spain  8.3  8.2  2.0  9.0  8.2  -  1.6 
Greece  6.3  4.7  - 3.3  8.3c  6.4  -4.0 
Other  sectors 
Poland  34.1  35.7  1.4  31.8  34.6  1.1 
Portugal  55.6  56.1  2.1  36.1  42.3  3.1 
Spain  55.1  56.4  2.6  44.7  52.5  2.2 
Greece  53.1  57.3  2.4  40.4c  45.0  2.2 
Sources:  Rocznik Statystycztny (various years);  OECD  National Accounts,  1989;  and  OECD  Labor Force Statistics, 
1989.  GDP  calculations  used GDP  at factor  price  before  adjusted  to market  price. 
a. Greece, billions  of drachmae  in 1970  prices; Spain, billions  of pesetas in 1980  prices; Portugal,  billions  of 
escudos  in 1987  prices. 
b. Includes  mining,  manufacturing,  electricity,  gas, water. 
c. The employment  figures  for Greece  are from 1981. 
enterprises.  The anticompetitive  nature of the industrial  structure  is 
often exacerbated  by the presence of enterprise associations that tie 
together  firms  at the industry  level and  act as cartels. 
Consider  again the case of Poland. The average state enterprise  in 
Polish industry  (excluding  the so-called cooperative sector, which rep- 
resents 13  percent  of employment  in the state sector) has 1,132  employ- 
ees, typically  in  multiplant  operations.  The  average  number  of employees 
per plant (again  excluding the cooperative sector) is 378 (see table 2), 
compared  with about 80 workers per plant in a sample of Western 
economies. The 115 largest enterprises, each with more than 5,000 84  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 2.  The Distribution of Employment in Industry by Size of Establishment, 
Poland, 1937 and 1986, and Selected Market Economies 
Average  Workers  per establishment 
number  of  Greater 
workers  per  100 or  than 
establish-  fewer  101-500  501-1,000  1,000 
Country  ment  (percentage  of all workers) 
Poland 
1937  54  33a  27  41b  n.a. 
1986c  88  10  25  15  5Id 
State enterprises  378  6  21  16  58e 
Cooperatives  30  42  54  4  1 
Sample of 
Western economiesf  80  35g  33  13  19 
South Korea  n.a.  33h  67i 
Source:  Data on Poland from Rocznik Statystycznv  Przentysll;  data on sample of Western economies  in 1970 from 
Ehrlich (1985); data on South Korea in 1982 from World Bank (1989a). 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Includes employees  in establishments  of betweeen  6 and 100 employees. 
b.  Includes all employees  in establishments  with more than 501 employees. 
c.  Socialized  sector.  Employees  in the  private  sector  work  in establishments  with an average  employment  of  2 
workers. 
d.  Seventeen  percent of all workers are in establishments  with employment  greater than 5,000. 
e.  Nineteen  percent of all workers are in establishments  with employment  greater than 5,000. 
f.  Austria, Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Japan, and Sweden.  Percentage  of workers  employed  in total  manufacturing 
excluding mining. 
g.  Includes employees  in establishments  of between  10 and 100 employees. 
h.  Includes employees  in establishments  of between  4 and 99 workers. 
i.  Includes all employees  in establishments  with employment  greater than 100. Twelve  percent  of employees  are 
in establishments with employment  of  101-200;  11 percent  are in establishments  with employment  of 201-300;  and 
44 percent are in establishments  with employment  greater than 300. 
employees, account for more than one fifth of industrial  employment 
and  production.  16 At the other  end of the spectrum,  only 982 enterprises 
in all of socialized  industry  in Poland  have fewer than 100  employees. In 
Korea,  where small  and medium-sized  enterprises  have provided  much 
of the impetus  for growth  and economic development,  33 percent  of the 
labor  force is employed  in establishments  with fewer than 100  workers. 
This  contrasts  with only 10  percent  in the Polish state sector. 
The socialist  economies also lack adequate  procedures  for the entry 
and  exit of enterprises.  17 Enterprises  are typically "founded"  by minis- 
tries  or local authorities,  which at the same time arrange  for the funding 
to begin  operations.  Absent such sponsorship,  there  is little chance that 
state enterprise  activity can spring  up to meet even the most obvious 
16.  See Rocznik Statystyczny Przemyslu (1989, p. 5). 
17.  See Balcerowicz  (1989). David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  85 
economic needs. On  the side of exit, bankruptcy  and  liquidation  of state 
enterprise  activity has been virtually  unknown. In fact, the absence of 
markets  and meaningful  relative  prices in the economy means that it is 
difficult,  if not impossible,  to distinguish  between  enterprises  that  should 
and should  not survive. 
All countries  of Eastern  Europe  suffer  from chronic  excess demand, 
though  to varying  degrees. The extent of shortages  at official  prices has 
been very high in Bulgaria,  Poland, and Romania, and less severe in 
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  Yugoslavia.  In the former  countries,  the 
supply  of basic consumer  goods (such  as food) has  been erratic  and  often 
formally rationed. Active black markets exist  in which goods are 
available  at a multiple  of the official  price. In Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, 
and Yugoslavia, markets for basic consumer goods have generally 
cleared (though quality is  often low  and variety is  limited), while 
shortages  remain  acute for housing,  telephones, automobiles,  and  other 
types of consumer  durables. 
At the enterprise level,  excess  demand is manifested in chronic 
shortages  of basic inputs at official prices. There are informal  supply 
networks  through  which state enterprises  cope in part  with the chronic 
supply shortages. In Hungary  and Poland, where small-scale private 
firms  have  been allowed  to operate,  the  private  sector  firms  are  generally 
cut out from  these informal  supply  networks,  and  therefore  face extreme 
shortages  and the need to bribe individuals  in state-owned  enterprises 
to obtain  even a haphazard  supply  of inputs. 
Another coping mechanism  of all enterprises has been an autarkic 
production  strategy  in which the firm  eschews specialization,  at great 
cost to efficiency, in order  to produce  all the necessary components  for 
the production  process. It is more  or less the opposite of Japan'sjust-in- 
time (kanban)  production  organization, in which large firms rely on 
small, highly specialized firms to provide inputs on a carefully timed, 
highly reliable basis. In Eastern Europe, there are almost no small 
independent  firms servicing large enterprises. All work is done in- 
house.  18 
18. The results are sometimes bizarre. During 1976, when food shortages were 
particularly  severe,  the  industrial  enterprises  were  instructed  that  they  would  be permitted 
to raise their own farm animals  to feed their work forces. More generally, firms are 
integrated  throughout  the entire production  process. A shoe company makes its own 
cardboard  boxes for the shoes; an electronics  firm  makes  its own metal  castings, and so 
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The origins  of excess demand  lie deep within  the system and include: 
the planners'  drive toward  rapid  growth  through  heavy investment;  the 
soft budget constraint of enterprises engaged in constant negotiation 
with the financial  authorities;  the planners'  fear of unemployment;  and 
the communist  regime's lack of legitimacy to impose strong austerity 
measures  with public support  and its unwillingness  or inability  to do so 
by brute  force.  19 
The Economic  Crisis as of 1990 
The nature and timing of reforms will be dictated not only by the 
Stalinist  legacy, but also by the immediate  crisis facing  the new govern- 
ments. In all of Eastern  Europe, economic performance  has been weak 
in the 1980s, but the economic conditions have been especially bad in 
some countries. 
In Poland, an open hyperinflation  exploded in the fall of 1989,  at the 
time of the change of power from communist  rule to the Solidarity-led 
government.  In Hungary,  a deepening  foreign  debt  crisis in the later  half 
of the 1980s  and the resultant  tight  fiscal and  monetary  policies have led 
to falling real consumption  and rising inflation  (on the order of 30-40 
percent  a year). In Romania,  under  a brutal  schedule  of debt  repayments 
imposed  by Ceausescu  himself,  living  standards  sank  to the lowest levels 
in the region, with reports of widespread  hunger  and malnutrition.  In 
Yugoslavia,  a decade of high inflation  and a heavy foreign  debt burden 
caused a slide into an open hyperinflation  in the fall of 1989. 
In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the immediate conditions 
appear  to be somewhat  less acute, though  the situation  in East Germany 
reportedly  deteriorated  after  the large-scale  exodus of workers  in 1989. 
Reliable  information  is lacking  on Bulgaria,  though  the financial  condi- 
tions  are  apparently  deteriorating  seriously.  One sign  of deepening  crisis 
is the recent unilateral  suspension of debt servicing, announced  at the 
end of March 1990. According to available information,  Bulgaria  had 
been engaged in a rapid debt buildup in the past five years, which 
presumably  has cushioned  a crisis that  will now be faced. 
19. See Grosfeld (1987), Kornai (1980, 1989), and Winiecki (1986b). Soft budget 
constraints  refer  to the  cheap  credit,  subsidies,  tax  breaks,  and  the  like  that  have  cushioned 
enterprises  from  the rigors  of real  competition  and  have led to imprudent  investment. David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  87 
The Political  Context 
The collapse  of communist  one-party  rule  was the sine qua  non for an 
effective transition  to a market  economy. If one proposition  has been 
tested by history, it is that the communist  parties of Eastern Europe 
would not lead a process of radical  reform  sufficiently  deep to create a 
real market  economy. There were too many barriers:  the ideology of 
state  ownership;  the power  structure  of the party,  based  heavily  on state- 
enterprise  managers  and bureaucrats  loath to allow real competition  to 
the state enterprises; the communist leaderships' lack of legitimacy 
among  the public, making  it impossible  to impose the short-run  costs of 
deep economic restructuring;  and the low regard  in the West for the 
communist  governments,  making  it impossible  for them to mobilize  the 
international  financial  support  vital for the economic transition. 
Thus, the emergence  of noncommunist  rule has been a fundamental 
watershed  for real  reform  in Eastern  Europe. But, at the same time, the 
emergence  of noncommunist  governments  in the region not only does 
not erase all existing political difficulties,  but actually introduces  new 
ones. The economic strategy  must take cognizance of the new political 
context, which, in our view, argues overwhelmingly  for a very rapid, 
straightforward,  and sharp  program  of economic reform. 
The first  point  is the Latin  American  lesson of the 1980s,  that  a fragile 
democratic  opening combined with a deep economic crisis is a fertile 
brew  for populist  politics. Only decisive actions by a reformist  govern- 
ment can keep these populist pressures in check. In most countries, 
stabilization  by itself will require  a sharp  cutback in budget subsidies 
and a rise in unemployment.  The restructuring  of industry will also 
impose costs on particular  groups. The urgent need to address the 
deteriorating  infrastructure  (including  the  environment)  may  also require 
a reduction  in current  consumption.20 
These  conditions  will  produce  ample  opportunities  for  politicians  who 
promise  illusory low-cost paths to reform. In the short term, populist 
pressures  will lead to opposition to cuts in subsidies and to calls for 
20. To some extent, cuts in military  spending  and investment in heavy industry, 
combined  with  new external  financing  from  abroad,  can reduce  the need for large  cuts in 
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"reactivation" of the economy through  wage increases and demand 
expansion. In the longer term, populist politicians will find support 
among workers in declining industries,  who will press for protection, 
subsidies, and other steps to halt  the necessary industrial  restructuring. 
The risks are compounded  because both electorates and government 
officials will be highly inexperienced  in the process of real economic 
reform.  There is little doubt  that one dubious  scheme after another  will 
be proposed to try to circumvent  the difficult  processes of structural 
change. 
Governments  in the region  may also be stymied  by the likely reintro- 
duction  of prewar  electoral  rules based on proportional  representation. 
Voting based on proportional  representation  tends to produce weak 
multiparty  coalition governments  that have a particularly  difficult  time 
reducing  an inherited  budget  deficit.2'  The prewar  history of the region 
amply  demonstrates  this proposition.22 
Another  profound  political  difficulty  relates to the bureaucracy.  The 
new governments  of Eastern Europe are inheriting  bureaucracies  cre- 
ated and appointed  by the communist  party. The structure  and person- 
nel in these bureaucracies  will change only gradually  over time. There 
are tens, if not hundreds,  of thousands  of officials whose professional 
experience lies in a lifetime of bureaucratic  planning  of economic life, 
with close links to party-appointed  managers  in the state enterprises. 
The bureaucracy provides an extraordinarily  important practical 
argument  for radical  free market  policies, even in circumstances  where 
"market  failures" exist and pure theory might suggest more nuanced 
policies. It is naive to think of the existing bureaucracy  as equipped, 
professionally  or temperamentally,  to implement  sophisticated  policies 
based  on Western-style  theories  of the  welfare  economics  of the "  second- 
best.  " The  bureaucracy  cannot  be relied  upon  for efficiency  in regulating 
monopoly  prices,  promoting  infant  industries,  or  implementing  industrial 
policy. 
21. See Roubini  and  Sachs (1989)  for an empirical  demonstration  of this proposition. 
22. In prewar  Poland,  for example,  the electoral  system produced,  between 1920  and 
1926, a series of weak governments,  all of which were unable to deal decisively with 
Poland's  financial  instability.  In 1926,  General  Pilsudski  imposed,  through  a coup d'etat, 
a government  that  then  ruled  independently  of the Parliament. David  Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  89 
Other deep political fissures are likely to reopen, after decades of 
dormancy.  The prewar  rural-urban  economic battles in the region are 
already  revving up in Poland, and will likely do so soon in Hungary.23 
The nationalist  and ethnic battles, within countries  and between coun- 
tries, are also reawakening  at an alarming  rate. One can mention the 
recent  nationalist  violence in Yugoslavia,  between Serbs  and  Albanians; 
in  Romania,  between  ethnic  Hungarians  and  Romanians  in  Transylvania; 
in Bulgaria,  against  the Turkish  minority.  Even many  Slovak  leaders  are 
agitating  for a break  with the Czechs, or at least for national  autonomy 
within  a Czecho-Slovak  federation  with a weak central  government. 
Structural Aspects of the Shortage Economy 
Before turning  to the strategies  for reform,  it is essential to focus on 
the role of repressed  inflation  in Eastern  Europe. Repressed  inflation  is 
important  for two reasons. First, it is a fundamental  factor in many of 
the deepest economic problems of the Eastern European  economies: 
chronic shortages, poor export performance,  the weakness of private 
firms trying to compete with state firms, and even the widespread 
corruption  of state managers.  These problems  often appear  to be more 
intractable than they really are. A  strong dose  of  macroeconomic 
austerity  (tight  monetary  and fiscal policies) can substantially  alleviate 
many  problems  that are misinterpreted  as structural  rather  than mone- 
tary. 
Second, as a result of repressed inflation, the measured effects of 
various  reforms  are likely to differ  substantially  from their  real effects. 
For example,  decreases in real wages may well coincide with increases 
in real living standards, and vice  versa. Thus, policymakers must 
understand  the ramifications  of repressed  inflation  in order  to interpret 
correctly  the results  of reform  measures. 
23. In Poland,  farmers  have apparently  suffered  a terms  of trade  loss as a result  of the 
liberalization  of prices.  Input  prices,  such  as fertilizer,  feed  grains,  diesel  fuel, and  tractors, 
have risen more than output  prices. As a result, rural  political  organizations,  including 
Rural  Solidarity,  have  sharply  criticized  parts  of the economic  reform  program.  According 
to polling  data,  the popularity  of the program  in the countryside  is, as of March  1990,  lower 
than  it is in the urban  areas. 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
A Model of Repressed  Inflation 
Consider  a very simple situation, to begin our account of repressed 
inflation.24  Suppose  that  there  is a single  good, with a fixed  nominal  price 
P, and a fixed output supply S. Suppose also that nominal  demand  is 
exogenously given at the level Y. (We discuss the determinants  of Y 
later.) If Yis less than  PS, then output  will be demand  determined,  with 
output  equal  to YIP.  If Yis greater  than  PS, there  will be excess demand, 
and  all of S will be sold. We will define  excess demand  (ex)  on the official 
market  directly  as the proportion  by which Y  exceeds PS. Thus, 
(1)  ex =  (Y -  PS)IY. 
Let us assume the following  simple rationing  mechanism  in the case 
that ex >  0. A queuing  time q must be expended in order to purchase 
each unit of the good, where q is endogenous. The queue is formed  by 
arbitrageurs  (variously known in Eastern Europe as "middlemen," 
"black-marketeers,"  "profiteers," "speculators," and private-sector 
"traders"), who buy the output at the official price P and sell it at a 
"grey" (legal)  or "black" (illegal)  market  price  Pb. 
All individuals (including the arbitrageurs)  have a  simple utility 
function, 
(2)  U =C+wL, 
where L is leisure, and  C is consumption  of the good. We will aggregate 
over the population,  and  think  of U, C, and  L as economywide  variables. 
The variable w represents the (fixed) marginal  utility of leisure. The 
maximum  amount of time for leisure is the total nonwork hours, N, 
which  is equal  to the  difference  between  total  hours  (71)  and  hours  worked 
(H). Because output,  S, is assumed  to be fixed, H is also assumed  to be 
fixed. Waiting in line reduces the leisure time available below its 
maximum  value, N. Aggregate  waiting time is qS. Thus, total leisure 
time is simply 
(3)  L =  N-qS, 
or the amount  of time not spent  working  or waiting. 
24. An  elegant  and  sophisticated  multigood  model  of queuing  and  hoarding  phenomena 
under  excess demand  has recently  been put  forward  in Weitzman  (1990). David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  91 
We find the black market price by  assuming that the  "waiting 
business" has free entry and therefore  zero profits.  One unit of waiting 
yields a nominal  profit  equal  to 
(Pb P)-q, 
and  a real  profit  (in units of goods on the black market) 
(Pb -  P)/(Pbq). 
This must be equated  with the utility loss, w, from an increased  unit of 
waiting. Thus, 
Pbqw  =  Pb  -P, 
or, upon  rearranging, 
Pb =  P/(1  -  wq). 
Monetary  equilibrium  is given  by the  condition  PbS  =  Y,  so that  aggregate 
demand  equals the total value of purchases  in the black market.  There- 
fore, 
PS/(1  -  wq) =  Y. 
Solving  for q, we find: 
q =  (Y -  PS)/(w Y), 
or 
q =  exlw. 
Thus, the amount  of waiting  time is directly  proportional  to the percent 
of excess demand  in the economy. The utility level is also easy to find. 
Since total  waiting  is qS, leisure is given by N -  qS (equation  3), which 
equals 
N -  exSlw. 
Thus, as defined  in equation  2 and because the consumption  of goods 
equals  the supply  of goods, utility  can be described  as 
U =  S  +  w(N  -  exSlw), 
which  can be rewritten  as 
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When  ex >  0, utility  is a linearly  declining  function  of excess demand. 
We have a situation  described  long ago by Anne Krueger  as the cost of 
"rent-seeking"  behavior. Excess demand  is costly because it leads to 
activities  that  consume real  resources. In the example  here, the nominal 
excess demand is dissipated by waiting in lines, and overall utility is 
reduced accordingly.  Consider  the effects of changes in officially  mea- 
sured "real income," YIP,  on utility. When YIP  is less than supply S, 
output is demand  determined  and there is no waiting. Utility is simply 
given by 
U =  YIP +  wN. 
When  there  is excess demand,  then, as demonstrated  in equation  4, 
U =  S(1 -  ex) +  wN. 
The relationship  between "real  income" and  utility  is shown in figure  1. 
As long as the system is demand  determined,  increases in real income 
cause increases  in  utility.  But  when  the system  is characterized  by excess 
demand,  increases  in real  income lead to decreases in utility. 
Official statistics on real wages and real incomes in the Eastern 
European  countries  do not adequately  capture  the shortage  phenomena 
and  are  mostly  based  on official  prices-without taking  into account  that 
goods are generally  not available  at these prices without considerable 
queuing  or  other  expenses  (bribes,  side  payments,  black  market  activity). 
Starting  from a situation  of excess demand,  economic stabilization  and 
reform  are likely to result in measured  real income declines combined 
with utility increases, or at least decreases in utility that are much less 
than  what is suggested  by official  data. 
The complexity  of accurate  utility  measurements  when shortages  are 
ended is  suggested by a recent journalistic account from Warsaw, 
following  the sharp  rise in prices at the beginning  of 1990:  "'I cry when 
I pay for gas,' a prominent  editor  and friend  confessed, 'but one of the 
worst miseries of my existence-the  endless hunting  and queuing  for 
fuel-is  over.  When I first filled up hassle-free in January, I was 
euphoric.'  "  25 
25. Mariusz  Ziomecki,  "After  Years  of Communist  Rule,  Poland  Discovers  the  Miracle 
of Capitalism,"  Detroit Free Press,  March  27, 1990. David  Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  93 
Figure 1.  Real Income and Utility 
Utility 
s  Measured  real income, Y/P 
(Fixed supply) 
A Polish journalist recently made the same point more abstractly: 
No one likes it when his suffering  is belittled, but we remember  that real pay 
(what  you can buy  for a specific  sum  of money)  is real  only in a market  economy 
where you can actually buy what you want.  .  .  . Up to now, we have not been 
buying  television  sets because  they were not available,  whereas  now, we are  not 
buying  them  because they are too expensive. When  we finally  achieve satiation 
on the consumer  goods market,  real  pay will begin  to be what  it should.26 
The simple shortage model can be elaborated in several directions. 
First, excess  demand also leads to hoarding.  If each purchase is costly, 
it pays to bunch up on purchases, and to hold large inventories of goods. 
Not surprisingly, many households  in Poland have kept several kilos of 
sugar on hand, and farmers have kept a shed full of coal or fertilizer. If 
these inventory hoards are costly (involving storage costs,  depreciation, 
and opportunity costs),  they constitute  an additional burden of excess 
demand and reinforce  the conclusion  that measured  real income  and 
utility may move in opposite directions in a shortage economy. 
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The shortage  approach  also highlights  the possibility  of corruption  in 
the sale of goods. In the course of communist-led  reforms  in Hungary 
and  Poland,  private  trading  firms  (cooperatives,  as they are called in the 
Soviet Union) have been allowed. In these circumstances, state man- 
agers have taken the opportunity  to open their own private firms, to 
which they sell the scarce state outputs  at the official  prices. The private 
firm then resells them at the black market prices. In this way, the 
managers  are able to appropriate  for their private  benefit (and without 
queuing)  the scarcity  rents arising  from  the excess demand. 
Chronic excess demand has a particularly  systematic and harmful 
effect on the trading  system. Suppose that the economy produces an 
exportable good, Sx, and an importable  good, Si. For the moment, 
assume that the supplies are fixed. Let the nominal  exchange rate be 
fixed at the level E. Let us assume that exporters  are required  to remit 
their foreign exchange earnings at the official exchange rate, while 
importers buy foreign exchange from the central bank at the same 
exchange rate. We shall assume that the central bank has no stock of 
foreign exchange reserves. It simply sells what it takes in from the 
exporters.  If there  is an excess demand  for imports,  it rations  the foreign 
exchange  at the official  price. 
Suppose that the world price of the exportable good is 1, and the 
world price of the importable  good is P,,,. The official price of the 
exportable  in the home market  is E (the world  price times the exchange 
rate), and the official  price of the importable  is EP,,,.  Domestic output, 
at official  prices, is 
EP,ViSi +  ESx. 
From  equation  1 define  excess demand  as 
S5)  ex  =  (Y  -  EPEv,Si -  ESx)IY. 
The export market  clears domestically, in the sense that at the price 
E, we have Sx  > Cx,  where Cx  is the level of consumption  of exportable 
goods. The gap Sx -  Cx  equals X, the exports of good x. The import 
market,  on the other hand, is of course characterized  by the condition 
Ci >  Si, with the balance made up by imports,  I. The balance of trade 
condition  requires  that X = PJ?1:  imports  are restricted  by the amount 
of foreign  currency  earned  from  exports. 
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to get foreign  exchange at the official  exchange rate. But if there is an 
excess demand  for i at the official  price, the importable  good is rationed, 
and  a black  market  will develop with price  Pb,  >  EP,,,.  Let Y  be the level 
of nominal  demand, and let a Y be expended on consumption  of the x 
good, and  (1 -  a) Y  be expended  on consumption  of the i good. Equilib- 
ria in the markets  for the exportable  and the importable  are then given 
as follows: 
EC,  =  a Y  Demand for exportables 
Pb,Ci  =  (1 -  a) Y  Demand for importables 
Cx =  Sx -  X  Market clearing for X 
C, =  Si + I  Market clearing for I 
I = X1P,Vi  Trade balance. 
The model is readily solved. By simple substitution,  we are able to 
find the following equation for the black market  price relative to the 
official  import  price, assuming  that ex > 0: 
Pb/IEP,  =  (1  -  a)/(1  -  ex  -  a). 
Note what happens when excess demand  increases from the point of 
balance,  ex = 0. As excess demand  increases, the black  market  price  of 
i begins  to rise relative  to the landed  price. 
In this simple setup, we can interpret  the spread  between the black 
market  price  Pb,  and  the import  price  EP,V  as equal  to the spread  between 
the official exchange rate and the black market exchange  rate.27 The 
term  Pbi'P,vi  is a measure  of the price  that  individuals  would  be willing  to 
pay  for  foreign  exchange  assuming  that  they can  use the  foreign  exchange 
to import  freely the scarce commodity  i. 
Three types of inefficiencies are caused by excess demand in the 
open-economy  context. First, to the extent that middlemen  must queue 
to buy the rationed  import  goods, there is the rent-seeking  loss noted 
earlier.  Second, and  new to this model, there  is a consumption  distortion 
caused  by the gap  between  Pb,  and  EP,,,. Because of the excess demand, 
the country  consumes  too much  of its own exportable  (which  is in excess 
supply  on the home market)  and  too little of the importable. 
27. In  practice,  the black  market  exchange  rate  is usually  a function  of rationing  on the 
capital  account  as well as the trade  account, so that the black market  exchange  rate will 
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The domestic excess demand  reduces exports and thereby reduces 
imports,  driving  the domestic relative  price of the importable  above its 
world market  relative price. With  given levels of production  Si and Sx, 
there is a welfare loss coming from the strangulation  of exports and 
consequent shortage of imports. The result is as shown in figure 2. 
Production  is at point  A. Optimal  consumption  is at point  B, where the 
slope of the line  AB reflects  the international  terms  of trade  between the 
importable  good and the exportable  good. With  excess demand,  actual 
consumption  is at point C, where the slope of the price line facing the 
consumer, given by the slope of the tangent  of the utility curve at C, is 
steeper (higher  cost of i). 
The third  loss (not treated  explicitly in the model) is the production 
distortion  arising  because firms  will be induced  to shift their  production 
toward the import-competing  sector and away from exports, to the 
extent that they respond  to the rise in Pbi. There is a constant  refrain  in 
Eastern Europe that exports are not competitive. Some of the export 
problems  have to do with marketing  and design, since firms  have been 
separated  from Western markets for so long. But a large part of the 
problem  is the relative price problem. New export firms  in the private 
sector will not arise if the price of exportables  relative to importables 
has declined significantly  under  the pressure  of excess demand. 
Using this model, we can address  one of the least understood  issues 
in Eastern Europe: convertibility  of the currency. If we restrict our 
attention to convertibility  on the trade account, the model shows the 
basic conditions  for convertibility,  meaning  the legal right  of importers 
to purchase  foreign  exchange,  without  rationing,  at the official  exchange 
rate  E. From  this model, we see that  the sine qua  non of convertibility  is 
the elimination  of excess demand. When ex is zero in the model, the 
market-clearing  price for the import  good is simply  Pb, =  EP,,,. There is 
no rationing  of foreign  exchange. 
In this sense, convertibility  is a macroeconomic  (monetary)  phenom- 
enon, and not a structural  problem  related  to the competitiveness  of the 
export  industry  or the import-competing  industry.  Consider  the expres- 
sion for excess demand,  as presented  in equation  5: 
ex =  (Y-  EPViSi  -  ESx)/Y. 
Clearly,  if ex is positive, it can be reduced  to zero by some combination 
of reducing  Y  (budget  cuts, tight  money, and so forth)  and devaluing  E. David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  97 
Figure  2. Effect  of Excess  Demand  on Trade 
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Another  extension  of our  theoretical  analysis  of the shortage  economy 
involves  the  question  of inputs to the  production  process. In  a  generalized 
situation  of excess demand,  black market  prices for inputs  will tend to 
be above official  input  prices, often with devastating  results. Exporters, 
for example, are heavily penalized if the price that they face for the 
export  good is determined  by the official  exchange rate, while the input 
prices that they must pay are determined  by excess demand.  Suppose, 
for example, that the export production  process uses imported  inputs, 
as is normally  the case. As Pb,  rises relative  to E, the exporter  is squeezed, 
adding  to the anti-export  bias already  observed. 
Similarly,  if downstream  producers  are subjected  to domestic price 
controls, they will be squeezed by a rise in the black market  price of 
inputs. In the final years of the communist regime in Poland, when 
private  sector  activity  had  been  liberalized,  the main  complaint  of private 
firms  was that  they could not obtain  inputs  from  the state sector, except 
at highly  inflated  black market  prices. Because the private firms  were 
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prices, the firms found themselves strongly squeezed between rising 
input  costs and administratively  controlled  output  prices. 
In this way, the shortage  of inputs  leads to a devastating  disadvantage 
of private firms relative to state firms under the reform communism 
practiced  in Hungary  and  Poland  in  the 1980s,  and  to a deep disadvantage 
of the cooperatives  in the Soviet Union today. The private  firms  are cut 
off from  the informal  supply  networks  of the state enterprises.  They can 
obtain  goods only at the end of a long queue, typically  with a bribe  or on 
the black market, but at prices that are often prohibitive. An end to 
excess demand  is key to the promotion  of the private  sector. 
Sources  of Excess  Demand 
The Eastern  European  economies have experienced  chronic excess 
demand  and  shortages  in  the consumer  goods markets  for  decades. Also, 
Hungary  and Poland have suffered  from high open inflation  since the 
introduction  of partial  market  reforms under the communist  regimes. 
We should therefore  consider the underlying  driving  forces of excess 
demand.  In much  of the Western  press, the source of excess demand  is 
assumed to be a "monetary  overhang," a growing  mountain  of money 
in the face of administratively  controlled  prices. Such a view is much 
too narrow.  The stock effect of high  M/P-while  real-is  probably  less 
important  than  various  flow causes of high  nominal  aggregate  demand. 
These flow causes include:  large budget  deficits, as unpopular  com- 
munist  governments  have resorted  to large  and  often growing  consumer 
subsidies;  the soft budget  constraint  of firms,  which leads firms  to have 
an insatiable  desire  for credit  to carry  out investment  projects  of dubious 
value; the easy-money  policies of central  banks, in accommodating  the 
insatiable  demands  for investment  credits; the wage push pressures of 
workers  at state firms,  since these pressures  are only weakly resisted by 
state managers  (who are often themselves appointed by the workers 
councils);  and  the ideological  commitment  notjust  to "full  employment" 
in the Western  sense, but to zero unemployment  as a socialist norm.28 
The wealth effect of high MIP, by itself, is probably not decisive. 
Most saving by households is carried  out as bank deposits in Eastern 
Europe, since other forms of financial and nonfinancial  assets (for 
28.  See Rostowski  (1989b) and Winiecki (1986b). David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  99 
example, equities, housing) are not available. Therefore, a ratio of 
money  to income of 40 percent  of GNP, for example, which seems very 
high  by Western  standards,  is not so extraordinary  when one considers 
that  such  bank  savings  represent  the bulk  of household  nonhuman  wealth 
and that much of the savings are in nonliquid  savings accounts rather 
than  currency.  It is still  true,  however, that  the excess demand  pressures 
coming from high MIP could be eased by introducing  more attractive 
nonliquid  monetary  savings  vehicles, with  higher  interest  rates,  to reduce 
holdings  in highly  liquid  transactions  balances. 
A quantitative  assessment of these alternative channels of excess 
demand remains to be made (and perhaps never can be, given the 
profound measurement  problems involved in calculating excess  de- 
mand).  Our  hunch, however, based on the studies of Kornai,  Grosfeld, 
Winiecki,  and others, as well as the experience  of the Polish  reforms,  is 
that  the  insatiable  investment  demands,  accommodated  by state  planners 
and  by  the  central  bank,  have  been  decisive in  creating  chronic  shortages. 
The Strategy of Transition 
Both the economic logic and the political situation  argue  for a rapid 
and  comprehensive  process of transition.  History  in Eastern  Europe  has 
taught  the profound  shortcomings  of a piecemeal approach, and eco- 
nomic  logic suggests the feasibility  of a rapid  transition.  Moreover, the 
macroeconomic  situation  is deteriorating  in many  countries, and there- 
fore requires  urgent  attention. 
The transition  process is a seamless web. Structural  reforms  cannot 
work  without  a working  price system; a working  price system cannot  be 
put in place without ending excess demand  and creating  a convertible 
currency;  and a credit squeeze and tight  macroeconomic  policy cannot 
be sustained  unless prices are realistic, so that there is a rational  basis 
for deciding  which firms  should  be allowed to close. At the same time, 
for real structural  adjustment  to take place under  the pressures  of tight 
demand, the macroeconomic shock must be accompanied by other 
measures,  including  selling  off state assets, freeing  up the private  sector, 
establishing  procedures  for bankruptcy,  preparing  a social safety net, 
and  undertaking  tax reform.  Clearly, the reform  process must be com- 
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Politically,  as well, there  are  powerful  arguments  for moving  rapidly. 
Fragile  governments  facing  a deep economic crisis are  best able to carry 
out strong  measures at the beginning  of their tenure. For this reason, 
Machiavelli's  famous  advice is that  a government  should  bring  all of the 
bad  news forward.29  Indeed, barring  a political  disaster  emanating  from 
the Soviet Union, probably the greatest political risk facing Eastern 
Europe is not a resurgence  of communism,  but the Argentine  trap of 
political  and  social paralysis,  in which coalitions  of workers,  managers, 
and  bureaucrats  in  the declining  sectors succeed in  frustrating  the needed 
adjustments. 
For a government  committed  to a rapid  and comprehensive  program 
of adjustment,  the first  step must  be to end excess demand.  The shortage 
economy leads to rampant  rent-seeking,  queuing, hoarding,  and anti- 
export  bias, and  an anti-private  sector bias. Thus, excess demand  must 
be eliminated  first. Fiscal and monetary  austerity in turn (and in con- 
junction  with a currency  devaluation)  will permit  the establishment  of a 
stable convertible currency and thereby an end to the bureaucratic 
allocation  of trade. 
The second step of reform,  which can be undertaken  in parallel  with 
the macroeconomic austerity program, should be to create market 
competition,  based on the deregulation  of prices, free trade, the full 
liberalization  of the private  sector, and  the demonopolization  of the state 
sector. Prices should  be deregulated  quickly, in parallel  with the mac- 
roeconomic  austerity  program,  because the proper  relative prices are 
crucial  for all the necessary resource reallocations.  Price deregulation 
might  lead to a one-time  jump in prices, but not to an ongoing  inflation, 
as long as macroeconomic  policies remain  tightly  constrained. 
Some  economists  have  argued  that  price  deregulation  is too dangerous 
in the monopolistic  conditions  of the Eastern  European  economies. But 
such a view does not withstand  closer scrutiny. Most sectors in most 
countries  already  have numerous  firms and an even larger  number  of 
separate  production  plants  that could become separate  firms.  Far more 
important,  for most industrial  sectors, free trade policies (based on 
currency  convertibility,  combined  with a cut in trade  quotas  and  tariffs) 
29. And the former  Bolivian  Planning  Minister,  Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, who 
brilliantly  managed  his country's  stabilization  and  reform  process  during  1986-89,  used to 
put  it even more  succinctly:  "If you are going  to chop off a cat's tail, do it in one stroke, 
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can provide  an enormously  effective mechanism  for generating  compe- 
tition. Free trade  instantly  brings  to bear  on domestic firms  the compe- 
tition  of the rest of the world. Even if the domestic  production  structure 
is highly  concentrated  when viewed internally,  markets  may be highly 
competitive  if foreign  producers  are allowed to import  without restric- 
tion. 
For some nontradables  industries,  such as food processing  in Poland, 
the private  sector  will  be able  to compete  effectively  with  the state sector 
in a matter  of weeks. But  the private  sector  will emerge  only if the proper 
price  signals  exist. Thus, a transitory  period  of monopolistic  prices  might 
well occur in some areas, but attempts to avoid this transitory  period 
could lead to the failure to develop private sector competition in the 
longer term. In a small subset of industries, such as public utilities, 
telephones, and intercity  rail transport,  prices will inevitably  continue 
to be set by the state, as in almost  any Western  European  economy. 
The third  step of the reform  process should be privatization,  which, 
for  reasons  described  later,  is likely  to take  many  years. In  the meantime, 
state  enterprises  will have to be run  on a tight  leash-with  wage controls 
and  curbs  on investment-to check their  financially  wasteful  tendencies. 
In addition  to these tasks, several specific challenges must also be 
addressed. First, as unemployment  will surely rise under the reform 
program,  the governments will have to introduce a variety of labor 
market  policies, including  unemployment  insurance,  job retraining,  and 
credit  allocation  to individuals  who start  small businesses. It should be 
remembered,  however, that the unemployment  starts from negligible 
levels, so that even steep rises in unemployment  will tend to raise the 
unemployment  rates  to levels now existing  in Western  Europe. Second, 
Poland  and Hungary,  and possibly others, will have to renegotiate  the 
terms on sovereign debt. Third, since the state sector will remain 
significant  for several years, further  efforts-in  terms of rules for wage 
setting,  investment,  and restructuring-must be undertaken  so that the 
economy  does not fall back into financial  crisis after  an initial  stabiliza- 
tion. 
Skeptics  often ask whether  the austerity  cum liberalization  program 
outlined here can produce stable prices and economic growth. They 
observe that in Latin America similar programs  have indeed ended 
inflation,  but at the expense of hampered  growth.  In the case of Eastern 
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coming  years: economic integration  with Western  Europe.30  If convert- 
ibility, free trade, macroeconomic stability, and liberalization  of the 
private sector are all achieved, the power of natural  market  forces will 
reduce the gap between Poland's  $1,100  per capita  income and Western 
Europe's  per capita  income more than 10  times that  level. 
With skilled workers in Eastern Europe now earning about $1 an 
hour, the region will provide  an enormous  opportunity  as a production 
site for European,  Japanese, and U.S. firms  selling mainly  in the West 
European market. By April there were 1,200 applications for joint 
ventures  pending  with  the  Polish  Foreign  Investment  Agency. Hundreds, 
if not thousands,  of firms  are already  examining  factory sites in Eastern 
Europe  as potential  locations  for  parts  of their  production  process. They 
are finding a highly skilled labor force, with engineers, machine tool 
operators, foundry  workers, and so forth, that will-under  stable eco- 
nomic and political conditions-be  able to integrate effectively into 
European-wide  production  operations. 
To achieve the full  fruits  of trade  liberalization,  existing  trade  barriers 
(in both directions  between East and West Europe)  should  be removed. 
The Eastern  European  countries  must  negotiate  a new association  status 
with the European  Community  to give them  guaranteed  future  access to 
Western  European  markets.31  Existing  restrictions  of the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral  Export Controls (COCOM), barring  the 
export of high-technology  goods to Eastern Europe, will have to be 
removed.  Investment  treaties,  guaranteeing  repatriation  rights  on  foreign 
investment,  must also be negotiated. 
Much  of the pessimism  about  growth  in Eastern  Europe  results from 
the focus on the necessary decline of the region's heavy industrial 
sectors. More  attention  should  be paid  to the obvious  and  crucial  sectors, 
particularly  in services, house construction,  and  light  industry,  that  will 
grow considerably. Intense shortages exist in these areas, and, even 
under  the arduous  business  conditions  of reform  communism,  the  private 
30. In Latin America,  macroeconomic  stability  with outward  orientation  has in fact 
produced  favorable  growth  results,  especially  compared  with  countries  still mired  in high 
inflation  and protectionist  policies. But many  Latin  American  countries,  unlike  those in 
Eastern  Europe,  are predominantly  dependent  on volatile natural  resource  exports, and 
these countries  have suffered  serious  terms  of trade  declines  in the past  decade. 
31. In the longer  term,  the EC should  be expanded  to allow  for the actual  membership 
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sector  has  been  staking  out  a  foothold  in  these areas.  Ample  opportunities 
exist for rapid  expansion  in these areas. 
Creating the Market Economy in Poland 
As in other Eastern European countries, the growth of Poland's 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s created the impression that central 
planning  could generate sustained economic growth. The well-known 
upward  biases of the official growth statistics provide good reason to 
discount  the high  reported  rates of growth  during  this period. Nonethe- 
less it is clear that both industrial  and agricultural  production rose 
steadily. The growth of production  in these sectors was based upon 
large-scale investment in heavy industry and the absorption  of labor 
from  the rural  sector. 
By the early 1970s, however, it became apparent  that these sources 
of growth  were being  exhausted.  In  response, the government  embarked 
on a program  of modernization,  based in large part on the importation 
of Western capital equipment  and technology. Fed by these imports, 
real  investment  grew at an annual  average  of nearly 11  percent  between 
1970 and 1978 according to official statistics. As a result, industrial 
production  showed a 9 percent  annual  average  increase  over the period. 
Instead  of reestablishing  a foundation  for sustained  economic expan- 
sion, the modernization  strategy  led to a deep balance  of payments  crisis. 
Imports  from the West in the 1970s  were financed  by Western  credits. 
As a result,  the current  account  of the balance  of payments  went sharply 
into deficit,  peaking  at nearly 10  percent  of GDP in 1975.  External  debt, 
which  had  been negligible  in 1970,  exceeded $26  billion,  or the equivalent 
of 40 percent  of GDP, by the end of the decade. Finally, as the supply  of 
foreign capital dried up, imports from the West had to be cut back 
sharply,  with  import  volumes  falling  more  than  50 percent  between 1979 
and 1982. 
The balance  of payments  crisis exposed the incapacity  of the Polish 
economic system to sustain growth. During  the crisis years, 1979-82, 
which saw the birth  of Solidarity,  its clashes with the government,  and 
the imposition  of martial  law, real  investment  was cut nearly  in half and 
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projects  were stopped, and only later  resumed  at a slower pace.32  With 
this slowdown, it became impossible  to maintain  the standard  of living 
that  had  been supported  by borrowing.  As a result  of the  harsh  adjustment 
imposed  in 1982  under  the cover of martial  law, real  wages and  per  capita 
consumption  fell sharply, to about 15 percent below the 1978 levels. 
Growth  resumed  at modest  levels between 1983  and 1988,  and  according 
to official data the 1978 production  and consumption  levels were not 
restored  until 1988,  though  it is likely that  the 1978  living  standard  has in 
fact not been restored.33  See table 3 for the official growth statistics 
during  1970-89. 
On balance, Poland's economic performance  since the onset of the 
balance of payments  crisis in 1979  has been dismal. Aggregate  real net 
material  product, which attempts to measure the value-added  in the 
material  or productive  sphere,  was the same  in 1989  as in 1978.  Zbigniew 
Fallenbuchl's  analysis  of official  statistics  from  this period  suggests  that 
the actual  performance  was far worse than  reported.34  Importantly,  the 
price deflation techniques led to inadequate correction of  nominal 
magnitudes  for inflation  as it accelerated  in the 1980s. 
More telling was that the socialized (or public) enterprises in the 
industrial  sector, which formed  the backbone  of the economic system, 
were unable  to generate  any  growth  or vitality:  value-added  among  these 
enterprises  fell 3 percent  and employment  fell 14  percent  between 1978 
and 1988.  At the same time, measures  of the gross capital  stock and the 
consumption  of electricity  (up  30 percent),  coal (up  5 percent),  lignite  or 
brown coal (up 92 percent), and other raw materials  by industry  show 
substantial  increases  during  the period.35  Clearly  the economy has been 
under  great  strain  in the effort  to keep  output  from  falling,  an  accomplish- 
ment that was possible only because of increases in the capital-output 
ratio  and in the energy  intensity  of industry. 
The stagnation  of economic activity  is seen vividly in Poland's  failure 
to spur a vigorous growth in exports to service its debts. Poland's 
exports to the West increased  only 19 percent from 1978  to 1989, at a 
time that the real value of world trade expanded about 60 percent and 
32. See Fallenbuchl  (1989,  p. 125). 
33. For reviews of Poland's  economic  experience  in the 1980s  see Fallenbuchl  (1989) 
and  Kaminski  (1989). 
34. See Fallenbuchl  (1985, 1989). 
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Table  3. Output,  Inflation,  and Real Wages  in Poland, 1970-89 
Average  annual  percentage  change 
Net 
material  Consumer  Average  Real 
Year  product  prices  wages  wages 
1970-78  7.9  3.8  10.3  6.3 
1979-81  -6.8  13.1  16.3  2.8 
1982  -5.5  100.1  56.0  - 28.7 
1983  6.0  22.0  27.7  19.0 
1984  5.6  15.1  13.6  -1.3 
1985  3.4  15.1  19.9  4.2 
1986  4.9  17.7  21.1  2.9 
1987  1.7  25.2  21.4  - 3.1 
1988  4.7  60.0  83.9  15.0 
1989  -1.0a  257. lb  298.6  11.6 
Source: All  1989 data are from Ministry of Finance;  price and wage data for 1982-88 are from IMF, Internationtal 
Financial  Statistics;  NMP data for  1982-88 are from United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for Europe,  Economic 
Survey of Eiurope (1988-89);  1970-81 data are from U.N.,  Economic  Survey of Europe,  various years. 
a.  Estimate. 
b.  Changes  are  calculated  from  annual  averages.  With  the  acceleration  of  inflation  in  1989,  the  rate  of  price 
increase  was  much higher on the  basis  of  an end-of-year  comparison.  Consumer  prices  rose  636 percent  between 
December  1988 and December  1989. 
exports of Western European countries rose more than 50 percent. 
Poland's  response  to its inability  to export  to the West during  the period 
of martial  law was to reorient  trade  toward  the East. While  this reorien- 
tation provided  partial  relief from the restraints  on import  growth, the 
deepening  of ties with the East only delayed and impeded  the needed 
modernization  and  restructuring  of the economy.36 
The result  of Poland's  poor production  and trade  performance  was a 
failure  to improve  the standard  of living. According  to official  data, real 
per capita consumption  was only 4 percent higher in 1988 than 1978, 
compared  with a rise of 21 percent  in Western  Europe.  But the statistics 
clearly  overstate Poland's  growth.  The official  data capture  neither  the 
lack of availability  of goods at administered  prices nor other forms of 
36. See Fallenbuchl  (1989).  The lack of dynamism  in the export  sector stemmed  from 
the  perverse  industrial  resource  allocation  in Poland's  shortage  economy  and  a chronically 
overvalued  exchange rate. In the early 1980s Poland maintained  a complex multiple 
currency  system. Since 1982  there  has been one official  rate, which  has been chronically 
overvalued.  For example, the parallel  rate averaged  five times the official rate (with a 
range  of three  to ten  times)  between  1978  and  1988.  The  overvaluation  policy  was  conceived 
both  as an anti-inflation  policy and  a deliberate  attempt  to limit "excessive" profitability 
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hidden  inflation  described  by Fallenbuchl.  All in  all, it is clear  that  Poland 
fell further  behind  Western  Europe  during  the decade. 
What  is difficult  is to quantify  the size of the gap with the West. The 
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the World  Bank  place per capita  GDP 
in  1988 at about $1,800, using the official national income account 
statistics and converting  at the official exchange rate.37  Conversion at 
the more  depreciated  parallel  exchange  rate  of that  year  (orat a weighted 
average)  would  produce  a much  lower figure.  For 1990,  the IMF is using 
a figure  of about $1,100  per capita. On this basis, Poland's standard  of 
living is much  closer to that of Latin  America  than to that of the lower- 
income countries  of Southern  Europe.38 
Failures  of Communist-Led Reforms  of the 1980s 
After the onset of the balance  of payments  crisis, the government  of 
Poland  undertook  two stages of partial  reform,  in 1981-82  and in 1987- 
88, intended  to decentralize  economic  decisionmaking.  The  government 
achieved a modest success in the areas of production  and investment 
planning,  wage  setting,  enterprise  finance,  and  international  trade.  Many 
aspects of the decentralization  have eased the process of transformation 
to  a  market economy in  1990. Nonetheless,  the reforms failed to 
invigorate  the  economy, mainly  because  they  failed  to lead  to the creation 
of real markets  with real  competition. 
The attempts at decentralization  touched many areas of economic 
activity, but focused on improving  production  and export performance 
in the enterprise  sector. First, in 1982  most enterprises  were released 
from  mandatory  participation  in sectoral  associations  that  had  acted like 
37. See World  Bank  (1989b). 
38. These measures  of per capita income are much lower than have been found in 
other studies. Based on production  data (for example, tons of steel, inputs of energy), 
various  studies  have estimated  per capita  output  in Poland  in the range  of $5,000-$6,000. 
See Alton (1989)  for high-range  estimates. It is clear, though, that the production  data 
vastly overstate household  living standards,  in view of the high resource intensity of 
production,  for example,  very high  energy  inputs  per unit of output,  and the fact that so 
little  output  shows up as consumer  goods. 
Direct  data  on levels of consumption  of consumer  durables  tend to support  the lower 
numbers,  or at least figures  in between. In terms  of people per telephone,  or people per 
automobile,  Poland's rank  is between that of countries  like Argentina,  Mexico, South 
Africa,  and  Panama,  which  have  per  capita  GDPs  of $1  ,800  to $3,000,  and  that  of countries 
like Greece,  Ireland,  Spain,  or Portugal,  which  have  per  capita  GDPs  in the range  of $4,000 
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cartels in their particular  markets. As it turned  out, many enterprises 
formed  voluntary  associations  to retain  informal  linkages  that  guaranteed 
their  market  power. 
Second, in an effort to reduce central  control over the management 
of material  balances in the economy, enterprises were progressively 
given  greater  autonomy  over  productive  decisions. The  central  allocation 
of inputs  was steadily  reduced  from  70 percent in 1982  to only about 10 
percent last year. On the other hand, two special practices also intro- 
duced in 1982, "operational  programs"  and "government  contracts," 
provided  new forms of central  coordination  of productive  activity and 
the allocation  of inputs.  Leszek Balcerowicz  explains  that  in 1986,  these 
mechanisms  meant that the government  was still involved in about 80 
percent  of the sales of producer  goods.39 
Third,  centrally  planned  investment  was gradually  reduced, leaving 
enterprises responsible for more of the financing and execution of 
investment projects. Fourth, some producer prices were freed from 
administrative  control. Instead, for a wide range  of goods, prices were 
regulated  on the basis of costs and subjected  to government  monitoring. 
For  some goods, "contract"  pricing  was allowed, meaning,  in principle, 
that  prices  were free to be set in the marketplace. 
In the event, the system was changed frequently in the 1980s and 
remained  complex  throughout  the  period.  On  balance,  the  pricing  system 
became more rather  than less arbitrary  and was increasingly  subject  to 
bureaucratic  negotiation. Despite major adjustments  to administered 
prices in 1982  and 1988  and the attempts to make price determination 
more flexible, there was no fundamental  realignment  of relative prices 
nor  a sustained  elimination  of shortages. 
Fifth, and more important,  attempts  were made to decentralize  the 
wage-setting  process and thereby  increase  efficiency in the use of labor 
by permitting  enterprises  to determine  wages more  freely. But  the results 
were predictable:  accelerating  wage increases. The managers,  intent  on 
industrial  peace, were content to concede to wage demands.40  Workers 
pushed for wage increases to capture the income flow that would 
39. See Balcerowicz  (1989,  p. 44). 
40. Indeed, under  the reforms  of the state enterprises,  workers  councils were given 
more  control  over managers,  and hence over wage decisions. Managers  were sometimes 
elected directly  by workers  councils. More  generally,  they had  little incentive  to oppose 
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otherwise accrue to the state, and the large and influential  state enter- 
prises could find  cheap financing  or subsidies  to fund  wage increases. In 
any event, the Polish economy was in a perpetual state of over-full 
employment  and  labor  shortage,  which kept up the wage pressures. 
Sixth, efforts were made to improve the international  trade and 
exchange  system. Enterprises  were  given some latitude  to conduct  trade 
themselves, rather  than  relying  exclusively on the foreign  trade  organi- 
zations, a few large state trading  companies  that had dominated  inter- 
national trade. Then in 1985, the government decided to reduce the 
overvaluation  of the zloty and  began  to depreciate  the official  exchange 
rate at a pace far more rapid  than the rate of inflation.  Ultimately, this 
policy failed to trigger  a fundamental  improvement  in export perfor- 
mance.41  The parallel  exchange rate remained  a multiple  of the official 
exchange rate throughout  the period  of real depreciation  because of the 
general  condition  of shortage  created  by the macroeconomic  imbalances 
in the economy. Currency  convertibility  was considered a far-distant 
goal even by ardent  reformers  and attempts  to fine-tune  the exchange 
system led to an increasingly  complex and arbitrary  multiple  currency 
system. 
An important  goal of the decentralization  effort was to make enter- 
prises self-financing  in order  to instill financial  discipline  and, thereby, 
harden  the soft budget  constraint.  Profitability  was to become the key 
criterion  according  to which enterprises  would be judged, and, accord- 
ingly, management  was expected  to seek efficiency  and  improve  product 
quality. The banking  system and the budget authorities  were to judge 
enterprises  according  to their  performance,  ending  the automatic  accom- 
modation  of demands  for subsidies, tax reliefs, and credits. Enterprises 
judged nonviable  were to face bankruptcy. 
In practice, little came of efforts to instill financial  discipline  among 
enterprises.  Following  the introduction  of a bankruptcy  law in 1983,  only 
11 state enterprises  were liquidated.  An initiative  to enforce the bank- 
ruptcy procedures in 1988 led to the identification  of 140 enterprises 
deemed candidates,  but the decision to begin liquidation  was taken in 
only  33  cases. In  addition,  attempts  to wrest  control  over  the  appointment 
of enterprise  management  from  the communist  party  were ineffective. 
41. For a general  discussion of the anti-export  bias of the socialist economies, see 
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Moreover,  decentralization  actually  increased  bureaucratic  bargain- 
ing, as direct central control was replaced with a plethora of indirect 
policy instruments  that  came  to be exercised  with  growing  arbitrariness. 
Enterprises  bargained  for credits, subsidies, tax reliefs, and access to 
foreign  exchange.  The rules  in each of these areas  changed  so frequently 
that  in practice  there  were no rules. 
Decentralization  in the end turned  out to be a poor substitute  for the 
creation  of real markets.  Enterprises  were neither  privy to the informa- 
tion that  markets  might  have provided,  nor  subjected  to the discipline  of 
market  forces. The lack of provisions  for free entry and  exit, the shelter 
from competition from abroad, and the absence of  capital market 
discipline  on investment decisions and wage setting all contributed  to 
the failure  to invigorate  the economy. 
The Emergence  of Hyperinflation 
The final year of the communist  system saw a complete collapse of 
financial  control in the budget, the banking  system, and the balance of 
payments  (various  data  are shown  in table  4). The setting  for the collapse 
was the ongoing balance of payments crisis. While Poland repeatedly 
rescheduled  a substantial  portion  of its debt service obligations,  actual 
debt servicing  remained  large. With exports stagnant,  the government 
had  to continue  to squeeze imports  and  hence living  standards  to produce 
the necessary  trade  surplus. 
The government  attempted  a new austerity  program  in early 1988- 
mainly involving cuts in subsidies and resulting  in sharp increases in 
consumer  prices-but  because of a profound  lack of popular  support  for 
the  government,  the  policies  were swamped  by a tidal  wave of subsequent 
wage demands.  According  to Ministry  of Finance  sources, the real  wage 
in the socialized sector actually  rose an average of 14 percent in 1988, 
though  the government  was trying to reduce the real wage. The only 
result  of the price increase was to unleash a wage-price-exchange  rate 
spiral: measured consumer price inflation accelerated sharply to 60 
percent  in 1988  and the zloty value of the dollar  in the official  exchange 
system rose 133  percent  between the beginning  of 1988  and February  of 
1989. 
Three  events in 1989  appear  to have played key roles in pushing  the 
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Table 4.  Poland: Selected Indicators, January 1989-March  1990 
Real  Official  Ratio  of  Real  Deposits 
wage  Monthly  exchange  parallel  broad  denominated 
(index,  change  Monthly  rate  to  moneya  in foreign 
Month  Januaty  in real  rate of  (zlotys  official  (index,  currency 
and  1989  =  wage  inflation  per  exchange  1988:4  (billions of 
year  1.00)  (percent)  (percent)  dollar)  rate  =  100)  dollars) 
1989 
January  1.00  -40.1  11.0  506  6.7  n.a.  n.a. 
February  1.18  18.2  7.9  526  6.2  n.a.  n.a. 
March  1.46  24.0  8.1  566  5.3  88  5.3 
April  1.29  -  12.0  9.8  631  5.5  n.a.  n.a. 
May  1.15  -  10.9  7.2  746  5.3  n.a.  n.a. 
June  1.24  8.1  6.1  849  5.4  89  6.1 
July  1.19  -4.1  9.5  836  6.8  n.a.  n.a. 
August  1.73  45.2  39.5  988  7.4  n.a.  n.a. 
September  1.30  - 24.5  34.4  1,340  7.1  57  7.0 
October  1.06  -  18.2  54.8  1,970  4.1  n.a.  n.a. 
November  1.08  1.9  22.4  3,077  2.2  n.a.  n.a. 
December  1.36  25.6  17.7  5,235  1.7  40  7.2 
1990 
January  0.77  - 43.2  78.6  9,500  1.0  32  6.3 
February  0.66  -  14.9  23.9b  9,500  1.0  31  6.1 
March  0.69  4.3  4.7  9,500  1.0  36  6.0 
Sources:  Wage,  inflation,  and  monetary  data  from  Ministry  of  Finance;  official  exchange  rates  from  IMF, 
Interntational Financial  Statistics;  the parallel exchange  rate is from Wyzanski  (1989). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Includes  only  broad money  denominated  in zlotys. 
b.  The  official  inflation data compare  the average  price level  for each  month with the average  price level  in the 
previous  month.  Estimates  of inflation during February (that is, comparing the price levels  at the end of the month) 
show  that inflation was  about 5 percent.  The  difference  derives  from the fact that the price level  was  much higher 
at the end of January than on average in January, because  of the corrective  inflation. 
legal access to foreign  exchange  in the parallel  market,  turning  the black 
market  white. This supported  a flight  from  the currency.  Second, as the 
result of the round  table talks between Solidarity  and the government, 
formal  wage indexation  was adopted  in April 1989.  The indexation  was 
intended  to guarantee  that wages would rise no less than 80 percent of 
the increase in retail prices over the rest of the year. In practice, the 
adjustments  guaranteed  by the indexation  scheme were in many cases 
added to  other wage increases already achieved. As  a result, the 
measured real wage in the socialized sector in August 1989 was 45 
percent higher  than one year earlier. Third, the last important  reform 
carried  out by the communist  government  was to free most retail  food 
prices and some agricultural  input  prices from controls in August 1989 
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explosion  of food prices (an  increase  of 180  percent  in August  according 
to the  official  statistics)  and  an  intensification  ofthe wage-price-exchange 
rate spiral. 
Poland's Reform Effort 
The Solidarity-led  government  took office on September 12, 1989, 
and immediately  embraced  as its principal  economic goal the move to a 
market  economy. The strategy  chosen to bring  about  this  transformation 
has been dubbed  a "leap to the market,"  because it involved  two radical 
steps, rapid  stabilization  and the immediate  liberalization  of prices and 
international  trade and finance. Taken together, these steps were in- 
tended to end the financial  chaos surrounding  the hyperinflation  and to 
introduce  competition  from abroad  as quickly and widely as possible. 
The  object  of competition  was the rapid  emergence  of markets  for  goods, 
labor, and capital,  thereby creating  an appropriate  environment  for the 
massive resource  reallocation  necessary for a fundamental  transforma- 
tion of the economy. 
At the same time, the strategy included a host of legislative and 
executive initiatives  aimed  at wiping  away the remnants  of the previous 
economic system and building  a legal and institutional  foundation  for a 
market economy. These initiatives included: privatization, to begin 
transforming  the ownership  structure  of national  assets; a competition 
program,  to break up and prevent monopolies, remove restrictions  to 
the entry of new enterprises, and introduce bankruptcy  procedures 
suited  to a corporate  setting;  banking  system modernization,  to increase 
the number  and  variety  of financial  institutions  and improve  the regula- 
tory, accounting,  and  prudential  environment;  and  tax reform,  to reduce 
the present reliance on the distortionary  turnover  tax and introduce  a 
broad-based  value-added tax and a personal income tax. The time 
required  to execute these initiatives will vary, and in some cases will 
take  many  years, but  much  of the necessary  legislation  has already  been 
prepared  and  adopted. 
The Preparation 
While  plans for stabilization  and liberalization  were being drawn  up 
between  September  1989  and  January  1, 1990,  several moves were made 
to prepare  the  ground  for  what  was to come. First,  a measure  of budgetary 112  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
control  was regained,  removing  the fiscal  pressure  for money creation.42 
Second, the wage indexation  scheme was tightened,  so that the indexa- 
tion  corrections  could  not be claimed  on top of wage increases  otherwise 
granted.  With  this change, real wages in the main  industrial  sectors fell 
37 percent  between August  and  November. Third,  the National  Bank  of 
Poland  (NBP) intensified  its efforts to keep the growth  of credit below 
the rate of inflation.  In the last quarter  of the year, broad  money (M-2) 
denominated  in zlotys fell 27 percent. 
As a result  of these measures,  particularly  the tightening  of credit,  the 
parallel exchange rate appreciated sharply from its low  of  around 
Zl 10,000  per dollar  in September  to about  Zl 7,000 per dollar  in Novem- 
ber and early December. Over roughly the same period, the NBP 
depreciated  the official  exchange  rate in steps from Zl 1,340  to Zl 6,500 
by the end of December. The aim was to allow traded  goods prices to 
adjust substantially  before attempting  price and exchange rate stabili- 
zation. As a result,  the exchange  rate  spread  fell to 64 percent  on average 
in December, the lowest spread  in more  than 15  years. 
Stabilization  and Liberalization 
The stabilization  and liberalization  program  began January  1, 1990. 
Stabilization  was to be achieved by a set of five mutually  reinforcing 
policies aimed at reducing  aggregate  demand and anchoring  the price 
level. First, budget  balance  would be quickly  restored  by a sharp  cut in 
subsidies  and investment  spending.  Second, the growth  of net domestic 
credit  of the banking  system would be tightly  controlled,  partly  through 
a sharp increase in interest rates in the banking system. Third, the 
exchange rate would be devalued and made convertible, and then 
stabilized  at the new depreciated  rate. Fourth,  the nominal  wage growth 
would  be limited  through  a tax-based  policy designed  to limit  the rate of 
increase in the wage bills of state enterprises. Fifth, prices would be 
liberalized,  except in certain  regulated  sectors (such as public utilities) 
42. Shortly  after  assuming  office, the government  sent to the parliament  a provisional 
budget  for the remainder  of the year, which was needed because the budgeted  nominal 
spending  limits  for  the  year  had  been  exceeded. Investment  spending  was  cut  back  sharply. 
The  liberalization  of food prices  in August  and,  then, the  elimination  of the remaining  food 
subsidies  in October  slashed  expenditures  on food subsidies,  which  had  been 5 percent  of 
GDP  in 1988.  In addition,  several  import  subsidies  and  selected  agricultural  subsidies  were 
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where there would be a sharp, one-time adjustment.  The liberalization 
would  bring  about  a one-time  corrective  inflation  that  would  correspond 
to a reduction  in the real  value of zloty-denominated  money. 
Thus,  aggregate  demand  was to be reduced  through  several  channels: 
a tight  budget,  a restrictive  policy of new credit  expansion  by the central 
bank, a reduction  in real money balances, and a reduction  in the real 
wage. 
On January 1, the official exchange rate was  depreciated from 
Zl 6,500  per  dollar  to Zl 9,500  per dollar,  and  currency  convertibility  was 
established. The government  replaced the existing system of multiple 
exchange rates with a single, fixed exchange rate for current  account 
transactions  .43  Exporters  now surrender  their  foreign  currency  proceeds 
at  a single  uniform  exchange  rate,  and  importers  have  unrestricted  access 
to foreign  currency  at the same official  rate.44  While  the government  did 
not commit to maintain  the nominal  parity of Zl 9,500 per dollar, the 
NBP has kept  the official  exchange  rate  fixed  throughout  the first  quarter 
of 1990. 
Households that want to  purchase dollars for non-trade-related 
reasons may do so in a parallel "kantor" market. Since the kantors 
(money  exchange  houses) may always sell dollars  to the central  bank  at 
the official  exchange  rate, the value of the currency  in the kantor  market 
can  never  appreciate  beyond  the official  exchange  rate. The kantors  may 
also be supplied  with dollars  at the official  exchange  rate  on a discretion- 
ary basis. In practice, since January  1, the kantor exchange rate has 
been within  a couple of percent  of the official  exchange  rate of Zl 9,500. 
43. The system at the end of 1989 involved an overvalued official exchange rate 
accompanied  by a variety  of rationing  devices. Exporters  were required  to remit  part  of 
their  earnings  at the official  exchange  rate, retaining  the remainder  in foreign  exchange 
according  to various  "retention  quota"  rules. On  the import  side, some  foreign  exchange 
was administratively  allocated,  and  some was sold to importers  in a series  of auctions. 
44. Official  foreign  exchange  is not provided  freely for capital  account  transactions. 
The reason  for distinguishing  capital  from current  transactions  upon the introduction  of 
convertibility  was concern on the part of the government  and the NBP regarding  the 
defensibility  of a fixed parity,  given the uncertainties  surrounding  the launching  of the 
stabilization  program.  This concern stemmed  from  the fact that Poland's  stock of liquid 
international  reserves  on January  1 totaled  about  the equivalent  of one month's  imports 
from  the  West.  Accordingly,  under  the present  system  households  are  free  to make  foreign 
exchange  transactions  in the parallel  market,  but  enterprises  are  prohibited  from  doing  so, 
nor  are  they  permitted  to increase  their  holdings  of foreign  currency  deposits.  It  is intended 
that macroeconomic  policies will be managed  so as to suppress the emergence of a 
substantial  parallel  market  spread  due to capital  flows. Throughout  the first quarter  of 
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The stability of the official exchange rate and the lack of a parallel 
market spread has meant that, since the impact of the January 1 
depreciation,  the prices of traded  goods have remained  very stable in 
zloty terms. This effect on traded  goods prices has made the exchange 
rate an effective nominal  anchor. 
The exchange rate depreciation was accompanied by a massive 
adjustment  of prices brought about by price liberalization  and huge 
adjustments  of administered  prices. Just before the January 1 target 
date, most of the remaining  price controls on consumer  and producer 
goods were removed, leaving only about 5 percent of consumer  prices 
and 5 percent of producer  prices subject to control. The bulk of the 
remaining  controls cover goods and services commonly regulated in 
Western economies, such as public utility rates, public transportation 
fares, and goods produced  in highly  concentrated  sectors, such as coal, 
where monopolistic  practices  might  be expected. 
Energy  prices, which  had  fallen sharply  in real terms  over the course 
of 1989,  shot up, with  regulated  coal and  electricity  prices  rising  between 
300 percent and 600 percent and gasoline and other petroleum  prices 
freed from price controls. Apparently  the energy price increases were 
swiftly passed through  to final  goods prices of industrial  goods, distri- 
bution  charges,  and  retail  prices. 
The exchange rate depreciation,  price liberalization,  and the sharp 
increases  in administered  prices  produced  a burst  of corrective  inflation. 
Consumer  prices in January  were measured  to be 78 percent higher  on 
average than in December, according to the official consumer price 
index. Ministry  of Finance  officials  estimate  that  prices  rose 112  percent 
from  the end of December  to the end of January.  The bulk  of the increase 
clearly  took place within  the first  two weeks of the month. According  to 
a weekly price survey conducted by the Ministry of Finance, which 
produced  a comprehensive  index  beginning  in the third  week of January, 
consumer prices rose only 1.3 percent and 0.5 percent in the last two 
weeks of January.  Inflation  remained  low in February  and March.  The 
Ministry  of Finance survey shows that inflation  in February  was about 
5 percent  on a point-to-point  basis, and the official  statistics  report  that 
March  inflation  was also about  5 percent.45 
45. Because prices rose sharply  in January,  but were leveling off in February,  the 
average  month-over-month  inflation  rate  for February  was 23 percent,  while  the endpoint- 
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The government  also adopted  a taxed-based  policy aimed  at prevent- 
ing the corrective inflation  from being incorporated  into wages. Upon 
the expiration  of the wage indexation law at the end of 1989, a wage 
norm was established that allowed enterprise  wage bills to rise by 30 
percent of the increase in retail prices in January, and 20 percent 
thereafter.  Increases  in the wage bill above this norm  were subjected  to 
tax rates of 200 percent and more for larger  increases. In this decision, 
the government  compromised  between  two approaches  most commonly 
taken  in stabilization  efforts:  a complete wage liberalization  and a wage 
freeze. 
Full  wage  liberalization  was supported  by some Polish  economists  on 
the grounds  that  a flexible  adjustment  of wages was needed to facilitate 
real economic transformation.  While viewed sympathetically,  this ar- 
gument was rejected for two reasons. First, with subsidies being so 
sharply  cut, there was a danger  that the rise in prices would set off a 
destructive  wage-price  spiral.46  Second, because the economy is domi- 
nated  by state enterprises,  there is, in wage setting, an inherent  lack of 
market  discipline  that in a normal  economy is provided  by the owners 
of the firm.  Poland's recent experience had confirmed  that state enter- 
prise managers  had little taste or power to resist the wage demands  of 
the work  force, even when the higher  wages sharply  reduced  the profits 
accruing  to the Treasury. 
It was recognized  that  the wage  policy would  bring  about  a substantial 
decline in the measured real wage as subsidies and shortages were 
eliminated.  But it was also recognized  that the real wage decline would 
greatly  overstate  the actual  decline in real living standards,  because the 
price adjustments  were occurring  in a shortage  economy. As our theo- 
retical  analysis has shown, it was even possible that real wages would 
fall while  utility  levels would  rise.47  It was indeed  widely agreed  that  the 
46. In  other  words,  since  the economy  was being  hit  by a (necessary  and  self-imposed) 
supply  shock, it was important  that  nominal  wages not be raised  in an attempt  to keep up 
with  price  increases. 
47. We noted earlier  that with shortages,  official  prices do not capture  the effective 
prices (including  queuing)  paid by consumers. But there is another reason why the 
reduction  in the real  wage  overstates  the fall  in living  standards,  one that  is common  to all 
high  inflations.  During  a high  inflation,  the "inflation  tax" reduces  the  real  value  of nominal 
money  balances  held  by households,  with  the result  that  the real  wage  level overstates  the 
real  consumption  level that  it can support. 
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sharp  real wage increases in 1988  and 1989  had failed to improve  living 
standards,  because they fueled shortages and inflation. In the event, 
measured  real wages in the five main industrial  sectors during  March 
1990 were 36 percent, excluding bonus payments (and 14 percent 
including  bonus payments),  lower than  in November  of 1989.48 
One indication  that living standards  have probably  not deteriorated 
as sharply  as measured  is the increasingly  positive response  to questions 
about  material  well-being  in recent  opinion  polls. Last fall, 84 percent  of 
respondents to the official, government opinion poll described their 
material well-being as somewhat bad to very bad (see table 5). The 
overwhelming  negative  response  was a realistic  appraisal  of the abysmal 
state of the economy and  presumably  also a reflection  of the hyperinfla- 
tion that was breaking  out. As fundamental  improvements in living 
standards  will come only in the course of the economic transformation, 
a large  proportion  of the  population  continues  to report  that  their  material 
well-being is poor. Nonetheless, there is a significant and growing 
positive  response:  the  fraction  of respondents  who  feel that  their  material 
well-being  is at least not bad  rose from 13  percent  last fall, to 20 percent 
in January and 27 percent in March. Similar, but more dramatic, 
improvements  have taken place in perceptions about the state of the 
economy as a whole. 
At the same time that  the government  adopted  its wage program,  the 
growth  of net domestic  assets of the banking  system was brought  under 
control.  Legislation  was approved  by the parliament  to prohibit  the NBP 
from extending credit to the national budget, aside from a small and 
limited amount  of seasonal credit. Accordingly, the 1990  budget calls 
for the reduction of the deficit to the equivalent of 1 percent of GDP 
(from more than 8 percent in 1989)  to be funded by non-central bank 
at the beginning  of the month  is 1.0. His real  wage will be measured  as 100.  Now suppose 
that he keeps his wage in cash throughout  the month,  and spends  the 100  in the middle  of 
the month. If prices remain  constant,  real consumption  will equal 100. If prices double, 
however, real consumption  will equal 50. The real wage index will overstate the real 
consumption  level. 
When  hyperinflation  is ended,  and  the inflation  tax disappears,  it is therefore  likely  that 
the measured  decline  in the real  wage will overstate  the resulting  fall in real consumption 
supported  by the new real  wage. 
48. The appropriate  comparison  is with November, rather  than December, when a 
special  indexation  adjustment  was paid  in anticipation  of the price  increases  set for  January 
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Table  5. Poland:  Economic  Opinion  Polls 
Percent 
September  November  January  February  March 
Item  1989  1989  1990  1990  1990 
Material  well-being 
Very good  0.3  1.4  0.6  1.2  1.4 
Good  1.9  3.5  3.0  2.9  5.1 
Not good, not bad  10.5  16.2  15.9  16.8  20.3 
Somewhat  bad  19.7  27.0  29.7  29.2  32.6 
Bad  32.8  28.3  29.8  28.7  25.4 
Very bad  31.8  19.6  17.4  18.6  10.6 
Undecided  2.9  3.9  3.6  2.5  4.6 
Overall  economic situation 
Very good  0.6  1.1  0.6  1.8  3.2 
Good  0.4  2.7  1.6  3.7  10.6 
Not good, not bad  4.8  9.6  9.8  15.9  25.4 
Somewhat  bad  17.2  34.1  29.1  34.0  30.2 
Bad  32.8  30.2  32.0  27.6  18.3 
Very bad  42.9  20.8  24.8  14.7  7.8 
Undecided  1.3  1.4  2.0  2.4  4.5 
Source:  Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej  (Central Opinion Polling Service)  (April 1990). 
finance. Government subsidies will fall by about 8 percent of GDP, 
owing  to the elimination  of food and  agricultural  input  subsidies, a deep 
cut in coal subsidies, and the reduction  of real wages paid by industrial 
enterprises.  In addition,  the real wage decline in the budgetary  sphere 
will drive down the ratio of government  wage payments in relation  to 
GDP. 
The spending  cuts are partly  offset by increases in spending  for new 
social safety net programs  and other forms of social insurance,  so total 
expenditure  (including  subsidies) is budgeted to fall by 4 percentage 
points of GDP. Revenues, on the other hand, should return to the 
proportion  of GDP  achieved  in 1988  owing  to the effect of lower inflation 
in generating  higher  real tax revenues (the so-called Tanzi effect) and 
the elimination  of various  forms of tax relief available  in 1989.  As it has 
turned  out, the national  budget  is apparently  in surplus in  the first  quarter 
of 1990.  A large  deficit  early  in the year  had  been expected, both  because 
of seasonal  factors  and  the impact  of the stabilization  measures. 
The NBP has maintained  a tight rein on credit expansion to the rest 
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rates and closer supervision  of the credit activities of the major  com- 
mercial banks. The basic rate for loans from the NBP to the state 
commercial  banks was, on a monthly  basis, 36 percent in January,  20 
percent in February,  and 10 percent in March. These extraordinarily 
high monthly rates have exceeded the inflation  rate by a large margin 
since mid-January  and, in light of the fixed exchange rate parity, have 
given savers a large premium  over returns  on foreign currency  assets. 
With  the demand  for credit  on the part  of enterprises  sharply  reduced  by 
the high interest rates, the stock of net domestic assets in the banking 
system fell more than 50 percent in real terms between January  1 and 
mid-March. 
The measures  aimed  at rapid  stabilization  are also part  of the plan  to 
create real markets  in the Polish economy as rapidly  as possible. The 
most important  example  is that  the establishment  of currency  converti- 
bility  and  the restoration  of macroeconomic  balance  have made  possible 
a sweeping liberalization  of the international  trade  regime. Trade  liber- 
alization was intended to bring  competition to the economy instantly 
and provide a counterweight  to the extreme concentration  in industry. 
Quite simply, free trade  was viewed as the quickest and most effective 
anti-monopoly  policy. Of course in the longer run, free trade  would be 
an essential ingredient  of the process of integration  with the West. It 
would bring  Western  technology  to Poland  and ensure a steady growth 
of demand. 
To strengthen  the move to free trade, quantitative  restrictions on 
imports from the West were eliminated, and, with the exception of 
temporary  surcharges  on luxury  consumer  goods and  a few exemptions, 
a uniform  tariff  of 20 percent  was adopted. Similarly  the export regime 
was liberalized  with  the elimination  of most quantitative  restrictions  and 
decreases in export taxes. Moreover, the rules restricting  enterprises 
from  participating  in international  commerce  were liberalized,  loosening 
the tight  grip  of the foreign  trade  organizations  in this area. 
Poland's  reform  program  has been supported  by two important  forms 
of financial assistance from the West. First and foremost has been 
balance of payments support. The NBP's meager reserve of liquid 
foreign exchange balances has been substantially  bolstered by a $700 
million standby arrangement  with the IMF, a $215 million Bank for 
International  Settlements  bridge  loan to the first  drawing  of the standby, 
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ments. The availability  of this balance of payments support made it 
possible for the Polish authorities to consider the introduction  of a 
convertible and stable exchange rate. The increased backing for the 
zloty made  the defense of the zloty more  credible. 
A second  form  of Western  financial  assistance  is temporary  cash-flow 
relief  from  external  indebtedness.  Poland's  external  debt in convertible 
currencies  stood at $40.3  billion  at the end of 1989,  of which  $27.7  billion 
was owed to Paris Club creditors, $9.2 billion to commercial bank 
creditors,  and $2.1 billion to CMEA countries. The interest  falling  due 
on this debt in 1990  is about $3.6 billion, which would consume more 
than  40  percent  of the proceeds  of Poland's  exports  of goods and  services 
to the West. To increase  the chance that  Poland's  economy can success- 
fully be stabilized, it was vitally important  that debt service payments 
be minimized  in 1990.  The Paris Club creditors  responded  to Poland's 
immediate debt servicing crisis in February, agreeing to reschedule 
virtually  all of the principal  and interest  falling  due through  March  1991. 
Meetings  with commercial  bank creditors  have not yet resulted in any 
formal  agreement  on cash flow relief in 1990,  but in the interim,  Poland 
has not been making  interest  payments  to commercial  bank  creditors  on 
medium-  and  long-term  credits. 
The Rapid Shift from  a Shortage  to a Surplus Economy 
As of April 1990, several initial goals of the stabilization  phase of 
Poland's  program  appear  to be within  reach.  The corrective  inflation  has 
subsided, and aggregate  demand  has been sharply  reduced. With tight 
demand  and a currency  devaluation,  Poland  has been able to introduce 
a convertible  currency,  a liberal  trade  regime,  the free determination  of 
most  goods prices, and  a reasonable  set of relative  prices  including  those 
for energy  and  food. 
The most immediate  consequence of the new environment  has been 
the sharp  reduction  of shortages  in the economy. Apart  from  those goods 
still subjected  to administered  prices, such as medicines, queues have 
all but disappeared.  Meat is freely available  at all times in the official 
shops. The notorious gas station lines are gone. Foreign consumer 
goods, such as bananas and strawberries, and consumer electronic 
products  are now widely available.  Durable  goods, many  of which used 
to require months or years for delivery, can now be purchased in 
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According to unpublished  survey evidence of enterprises, industry 
can now find materials  and spare parts that were in perpetual  scarcity 
under  the previous  system. Agricultural  inputs  are available  throughout 
the countryside. While it is difficult  to measure the value of time no 
longer spent waiting in queues and searching  for goods, as well as the 
savings  from  no longer  opting  for substitutes  when the desired  commod- 
ity is unavailable,  it is clear  from  survey  data  that  Poland's  economy has 
reaped  a substantial  gain. 
The most profound  effect of the "demand  barrier,"  combined with 
the cutoff of cheap credits, is the pressure that it places on state 
enterprises  to adjust  in order  to survive. Accustomed to a state distri- 
bution network  that accepted all factory output, regardless  of quantity 
or quality, enterprise  managers  now lack buyers for their goods. An 
extensive series of visits to state enterprises  by experienced Western 
management  consultants  has shown  that  the managers  of Polish  industry 
are struggling  to adapt  to the new environment.49 
In response, most managers  have begun  a two-pronged  strategy  that 
includes reevaluating  their production processes and, in the face of 
undesired inventory accumulation,  looking for new markets at home 
and abroad. As  an important example, enterprises have begun to 
economize on energy use, with many plants introducing  night shifts to 
take advantage  of cheaper  electricity.  Obviously,  the pressure  on enter- 
prises stemming  from tight credit is not a long-run  substitute  for profit 
maximization  under  private  ownership  and cannot be expected to lead 
to wholly efficient operations. On the other hand, the absence of easy 
credit  and ready subsidies  and tax relief in the new, restrictive  financial 
environment has forced enterprises to weigh cost considerations as 
never before. 
The combination of  high interest rates and an accumulation of 
inventories  in January  led to a wave of forced two-week vacations for 
employees. Subsequently,  workers  have begun  to lose  jobs. Official  data 
49. See McDonald  (1990).  For  more  anecdotal  evidence, consider  the following  report 
from  the Wall  Street  Journal  (Barry  Newman, "Poles Find the Freeing  of the Economy 
Lifts  Supplies-and Prices," February  21, 1990,  p. 1):  "Poland's  debt-panicked  managers 
haven't all sunk into fantasy. They are scrambling.  They are selling straight  from their 
warehouses,  driving  into cities to sell from  the backs  of trucks,  running  auctions,  dumping 
inventory  for scrap.  And  at the Tomex  woolen mill  in Tomaszow,  between  Katowice  and 
Warsaw, Wieslaw Mokrowiecki  is working  in the dark. 'I am saving electricity,' the 
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show unemployment  rising from less  than 50,000 in January to about 
266,000 by end-March (the equivalent of about 1.5 percent of the labor 
forceof  18million). Infact, only 115,000ofthis  numberwereunemployed 
as a result of layoffs; the remainder was accounted for by voluntary job 
leavers and new entrants to the labor force. More important, indications 
from industry are that many enterprises view  much of their labor force 
as redundant and that unemployment will continue to rise sharply in the 
months to come. The Minister of Labor has predicted unemployment of 
500,000 workers, while other observers have suggested figures of 1,000,000 
or higher. 
The slackening of the labor situation is also affecting the behavior of 
workers. Poland has historically been in a position of over-full employ- 
ment, with labor shortage making it easy for workers to change jobs and 
hard for enterprises to find new workers when they were needed.50  The 
labor situation has traditionally been further aggravated by widespread 
absenteeism  and sick leave.  Now,  however,  with workers afraid of job 
losses,  sick leave has dropped sharply according to unpublished govern- 
ment surveys.  Also,  wage  pressures  have  abated.  In fact,  enterprise 
wage bills on average have not reached the norms established under the 
tax-based wage policy in the first quarter of 1990, in sharp contrast with 
the dismal failure of the excess  wage tax schemes  in the mid-1980s. 
Anecdotal  evidence  supports  the  survey  data.  A  Polish-American 
reporter returning to Warsaw in March 1990 writes: 
The change in people's attitude  toward their work has been almost magical. 
Polish chefs, whom I had always classified as genocidal maniacs, suddenly 
started  turning  out palatable  meals;  perennially  dirty  Polish  hospitals  reported  a 
surplus of candidates for low-paying cleaning jobs.  In industry, sick leave 
decreased  by 80 percent. I discovered  that it became nearly  impossible  to lure 
even my most devoted friends  out for a chat during  their  office hours:  With  the 
threat  of unemployment  looming,  skipping  work  became  too risky.5' 
Trade data for the first quarter of  1990 and surveys  of enterprises' 
trade intentions conducted  by the foreign trade organizations  confirm 
that a process of adjustment is under way (see table 6). The trade balance 
on a shipments basis has produced a surplus of $778 million over this 
period, larger than the $556 million surplus for all of 1989. By March the 
volume of exports was  18 percent higher than a year earlier, while the 
50. See Rostowski  (1989b). 
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Table 6.  Poland: Trade Developments, 1989-90 
Millions  of U.S. dollars 
1989  1990 
Ist  1st 
quartet  January  February  March  quarter 
Trade balance  301  13  244  521  778 
Exports  1,958  337  754  995  2,086 
Importsa  1,657  323  510  474  1,308 
Source:  Informacja  Statystycztna (April 1990). Numbers  may not total because  of rounding. 
a.  Excludes  food  aid. 
volume of imports  was down 35 percent.52  The sectoral trade perfor- 
mance shows that exports of certain products, such as agricultural 
products, electrical machinery, and chemical products, have risen 
sharply  (see table 7). In other  areas, however, exports have fallen, as in 
the case of the steel industry,  where producers  are being squeezed by 
the much  higher  costs of energy.  Note that  March  exports  reached  nearly 
$1 billion  and  relative  to 12  months  before show a stronger  increase  than 
does the average  for the first  quarter  as a whole, suggesting  a rising  trend 
of exports. Of course, the information  is still far too preliminary  in 1990 
to assess the medium-term  impact  of the reform  measures. 
On the import  side, industry  is purchasing  large  quantities  of invest- 
ment  goods, presumably  in response  to the lifting  of restrictions  on such 
purchases  and  to relieve shortages  of needed  equipment  and  spare  parts. 
Raw  materials  imports  have  fallen  sharply,  partly  because  of the  domestic 
recession, but  also partly  to reduce  existing  inventories  of inputs,  which 
are excessive in light  of the present  demand  conditions  and  the high  real 
interest  rates.53 
The liberalized  environment  is also giving  rise to the emergence  of a 
domestic market,  much  of which remains  informal,  but which is appar- 
ently reducing  the market  power  of some of Poland's  most concentrated 
52. These numbers  probably  overstate  the trade  surplus  and  understate  imports.  It is 
likely  that with  free access to foreign  exchange  in the parallel  market,  and  at no premium 
relative  to the official  exchange  rate, the incentive  has risen  to smuggle  imports  to evade 
duties. Therefore,  some consumer  imports  are being financed  through  purchases  in the 
kantor  market  and  are  not being  registered  in the official  import  data. 
53. The sharp  recorded  decline  in agricultural  and  processed  food products  is affected 
by two special factors. First, food aid, which was substantial  in the first quarter,  is not 
recorded  as an import.  Second, Poland  experienced  a record  agricultural  harvest  in 1989, 
which  has reduced  its food import  needs. David  Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  123 
Table 7.  Poland: Non-CMEA Trade,  1990a 
Percent 
Percent 
distribution  Percent changes by volume 
distribution 
by value,  1989:1-  March 1989- 
Item  1990:1b  1990:1  March 1990 
Exports  100.0c  8.1  18.2 
Electrical  machinery  23.5  18.6  38.1 
Energy  and fuel  11.1  -13.8  -7.5 
Metal  products  14.6  -0.4  37.4 
Chemical  products  12.5  18.5  6.7 
Light industry  6.4  0.9  -  10.4 
Processed  food  13.0  -4.0  7.4 
Agricultural  products  7.6  60.7  21.8 
Imports  100.0c  -  19.5  - 34.7 
Electrical  machinery  45.3  41.2  8.8 
Energy  and fuel  6.5  - 31.8  - 33.5 
Metal products  7.4  - 29.8  - 56.2 
Chemical  products  15.1  - 42.8  -61.9 
Light  industry  10.4  1.3  -5.1 
Processed  food  8.1  -51.5  - 82.0 
Agricultural  productsd  2.0  - 84.3  - 86.3 
Source:  Informacja Statystyczna  (April 1990, pp. 68-69). 
a.  Non-CMEA  trade refers to trade in convertible  currencies. 
b.  Values in U.S.  dollars. 
c.  The breakdown of the distribution does  not total  100. The official sources  do not provide data ori the residual 
so we choose  to exclude  it from the table. 
d.  Excludes  food aid. 
sectors.  The most notable  example  of this phenomenon,  the food sector, 
illustrates  the many dimensions  of the change that is under  way. Food 
processing  had been one of the most concentrated  sectors of the Polish 
economy. From  the second week of January,  farmers'  markets  cropped 
up all over Poland, including  in the street in front of the Ministry of 
Finance, as farmers sought independent outlets for their produce. 
Farmers are processing food on the farms; independent, if illegal, 
butchers  are opening  up for business; and foreign food processors are 
visiting  to inquire  about  the possibility  of buying  Polish  meat  and  grains. 
Market  forces are also emerging  rapidly  in retail  trade, where previ- 
ously three  enterprise  chains had conducted  over 90 percent  of all retail 
business.  Even  the  packaged  and  labeled  products  of the  food processing 
industry  can now be found in the informal  markets, where they have 
been diverted  to circumvent  the huge retail  enterprises. 
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strategy  is a decline in output. The only comprehensive  data available 
on industrial  activity show a decline of about 30 percent in production 
sold, meaning  shipments  from  industry  to distributors,  wholesalers,  and 
retailers,  comparing  the first  quarter  of 1990  with the same period  a year 
earlier.  Accounting  for special  factors  and  the output  declines  during  the 
course of 1989,  the Ministry  of Finance estimates that production  sold 
fell about 20 percent between February  and the end of 1989  and then 
leveled off in March  relative  to February. 
There are several reasons for the decline in output. Clearly, the 
restriction  of aggregate  demand  has been severe, and output is giving 
way in response. In addition,  a lengthy  process of structural  adjustment 
has been triggered  by the  relative  price  realignments.  The  transformation 
of the economy will require  a massive  resource  reallocation,  with delays 
between the freeing  up of resources  and  their  reabsorption  elsewhere. 
In addition, the extent of the decline in production is  probably 
exaggerated.  The emergence  of new informal  markets  is substituting  for 
production  in the state sector. As an example, measured  production  in 
food processing  has declined  sharply  since the beginning  of the year, but 
it is obvious  from  the spread  of farmers'  markets  that  much  of the decline 
is simply  a shift  to informal  production  not collected in the official  data. 
The dynamics  of production  will for many months be dominated  by 
the process of dismantling  the shortage economy. For example, an 
important  reason  for the decline in production  sold is the initiation  of a 
one-time inventory adjustment  process. In January, the retail sector 
responded to the NBP policy of creating highly positive real interest 
rates by canceling deliveries from industry  and running  down stocks. 
For example, inventories  of foodstuffs were reduced in January,  with 
stocks of salt, barley, sugar,  and flour  falling  by 27 percent, 37 percent, 
54 percent, and 19 percent, respectively. While the interpretation  of 
inventory data is plagued by difficulties with price deflation, retail 
inventories  are reported  to have fallen  63 percent  in the first  two months 
of 1990.  Of course, a further  important,  but unmeasurable,  factor in the 
slowdown in sales is the consumption  by households of the hoards of 
goods that  were commonplace  in the shortage  economy. 
At the factory  level, the slowdown  in shipments  has thus far  led to an 
unwanted  inventory  accumulation,  which  bodes  well  for  price  and  export 
prospects in the coming months but is also likely to contribute  to the 
recession. The reason  is that  Poland's  industry  has protected  itself from David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  125 
the shortage  economy by holding  huge stocks of primary  and semipro- 
cessed inventories.  With  the elimination  of widespread  shortage  and  the 
new, positive real interest  rates, a sizable inventory  reduction  is likely 
to occur. 
Adding  to the difficulties  of industry  is the sluggishness  of trade  with 
the CMEA countries, particularly  the Soviet Union. The volume of 
imports  in nonconvertible  currencies in the first quarter  of 1990 was 
down 22 percent from a year earlier, mainly because of declines in 
imports  of energy and equipment,  both of which are vital for Poland's 
industry. Moreover, the volume of exports was down 3 percent in 
comparison  with the same period  a year earlier. 
The Remaining  Agenda 
Poland  faces enormous  challenges in the months ahead. Taking  the 
great leap required  courage and wisdom, and now the far side of the 
abyss  is proving  to be slippery  and  steep. The  primary  objective  in  the  near 
future will be to protect the gains in the areas of stabilization and 
liberalization.  The second objective is to press onward  in the areas that 
will determine  Poland's  long-term  economic health:  privatization,  eco- 
nomic transformation,  the liberalization  of economic activity, and the 
reduction  of external  indebtedness.  A third  objective  is to adopt  adequate 
social safety net programs,  so that the burden  of reform  is not unfairly 
distributed  and  does not undermine  the social consensus for change. 
The  most  difficult  task  in  any stabilization  is to stay  on course. Already 
in Poland,  the emergence  of unemployment  has evoked calls for reacti- 
vation  and  recommendations  to loosen credit,  expand  public  investment, 
and boost wages, as ways of halting  the recession. And these calls for 
reactivation  have arisen  even though  by April 1, the unemployment  rate 
had not even reached 2 percent of the labor force. Reactivation,  by a 
large expansion of credit at this stage, would undoubtedly  jeopardize 
the stabilization  program,  as it has in the many  Latin  American  programs 
where  it has often been tried. 
The main reason for the failure of reactivation is that stimulating 
aggregate  demand  in an open economy inevitably  leads to a balance  of 
payments  crisis.S4  A wage increase, for example, would hit the export 
54. For a full discussion  of this point, with evidence from Latin  America,  see Sachs 
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sector the hardest, eroding competitiveness very quickly. Moreover, 
with little chance for a quick supply  response, an expansion  of demand 
would  spill  over into an increase  in import  demand.  In Poland,  a squeeze 
on export competitiveness along with a rise in import  demand would 
drain  international  reserves and threaten  a balance of payments  crisis. 
The authorities  would be left with the choice of abandoning  the new, 
liberal  trade  regime  or depreciating  the exchange  rate, thereby  setting  in 
motion  a renewed  wage-price-exchange  rate spiral. 
At present, Poland still suffers from a labor shortage, not a labor 
surplus,  with unemployment  less than  2 percent  of the labor  force. Thus 
there is little chance that an expansion of demand would lead to the 
absorption  of unused  resources,  as in  the  crude,  closed-economy  Keynesian 
theory. In fact, a rise in real wages would squeeze enterprises, and 
probably  lead to more, not less, unemployment.  Moreover,  it is prema- 
ture to begin to resist increases in Poland's unemployment  rate, as it 
remains  well below any conceivable notion of a natural  rate. Even to 
reach 5 percent of the labor  force unemployed, Poland  would have to 
see another 650,000 persons added to unemployment.  Moreover, the 
scope and potential  length of the transformation  now under  way could 
well result  in unemployment  rates  that  are  temporarily  higher  than  those 
experienced in healthy Western  countries. It would not be surprising, 
therefore,  if unemployment  in Poland  temporarily  reached  10  percent  of 
the labor  force (1.8 million  workers)  as part  of the adjustment  process. 
In the coming months, wage and exchange rate policy should be 
oriented  to the objective of consolidating  stability.  At present,  the wage 
environment  is nearly  ideal  from  the standpoint  of maintaining  stability: 
wage indexation  has been ended, and, for the time being, wage pressure 
has abated  under  the specter of rising  unemployment.  Experience  from 
Latin America demonstrates, however, that once the first stage of 
stabilization  has lowered inflation  to modest rates, wringing  the remain- 
ing inflation  from the system is usually complicated  by the inevitable 
demands  from  labor  for catch-up  wage adjustments. 
Catch-up  adjustments  are  ostensibly  granted  to cushion  workers  from 
real  wage declines. This reasoning  most often proves fallacious,  as such 
adjustments  usually  find  their  way into prices with little long-run  effect 
on the real wage, in the meanwhile exacerbating  unemployment  and 
appreciating  the real exchange rate. In the case of Poland,  the catch-up 
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enormous  shortage,  so that  actual  real  wage declines are  far  smaller  than 
suggested  by the data. 
A different threat to stability often comes from the IMF, which 
pressures  countries  for devaluations  to restore  real  exchange  rate  levels 
that existed at an arbitrary  date of the stabilization  program.  The IMF 
has wrongly  tried  to target  the real exchange rate by means of changes 
in the nominal exchange rate, a strategy that leads to rapid, if not 
explosive, inflation.55  The best chance for stability  is to recognize that 
the nominal exchange rate is the fundamental  "anchor" to the price 
level in an  open economy the size of Poland.  The prices should  therefore 
adjust  to the exchange  rate, rather  than  vice versa. 
Privatization 
In addition to short-run  policies aimed at consolidating stability, 
Poland  must  press  ahead  with  structural  transformation  and  other  longer- 
run priorities.56  Most important,  Poland must begin a rapid  process of 
privatization  of state firms, not only to assure efficient  resource use in 
the future, but to prevent the collapse of the stabilization  itself in the 
medium  term. Experience around  the world, plus the logic of the soft 
budget  constraint,  strongly  suggests that it will be difficult  to maintain 
the financial  discipline of the state enterprises  beyond the short run, 
especially  if the state enterprise  sector remains  the dominant  part  of the 
economy. Eventually,  wage pressures  and  lax investment  decisions are 
likely to undermine  the financial  health  of the state firms. 
The rules  and procedures  governing  privatization  in Poland  have not 
yet been put in place, with the delay reflecting the great political, 
economic, and administrative  complexity of the task ahead.57  Prime 
Minister  Margaret  Thatcher,  the world's leading  advocate of privatiza- 
tion, has overseen the transfer  of a few dozen state enterprises  to the 
private  sector in the past decade. Poland,  however, has more  than  7,800 
candidates  for privatization.  The great  conundrum  is how to privatize  a 
vast array  of firms  in a manner  that  is equitable,  swift, politically  viable, 
and  likely  to create  an effective structure  of corporate  control. 
55. In our opinion, an IMF policy in Yugoslavia  during 1988-89 that pressed for 
nominal  exchange  rate  adjustments  to maintain  a target  real  exchange  rate  was a key factor 
in the onset  of the Yugoslav  hyperinflation. 
56. This  section  draws  from  Sachs  (1990). 
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The complications  of privatization  begin with the fact that the own- 
ership  of the state  enterprises  in Poland  (and  the rest of Eastern  Europe) 
is already  politically  contested. In many cases, workers wonder what 
the fuss is about,  because of course they own the firms.  And communist 
managers  in many  firms  have simply assumed the right  to trade, lease, 
merge,  or even sell the enterprise  assets, often for their  own enrichment 
and  to the fury  of the public. 
Privatization  should  begin  by establishing  that  the central  government 
owns the enterprises  and has the exclusive power to engage in privati- 
zation. On grounds  of social equity, the government  should reject the 
workers'  claims  to full ownership  of the enterprises,  since the industrial 
work  force represents  only 30 percent  of the labor  force and 15 percent 
of the population. The workers' claims can, however, be partially 
recognized  by giving  them  preferential  access to a modest  fraction  of the 
shares of their enterprises and by giving the workers seats on the 
corporate board, as provided by company law in much of Western 
Europe. The government must also stop the managers  from walking 
away with state property.  For example, conflict-of-interest  laws should 
be used  to prevent  managers  from  laundering  state  assets through  dummy 
corporations  that  they create in the private  sector. 
The  overriding  aim  of the privatization  strategy  should  be to transform 
the enterprises  into private corporations,  with transferable  ownership 
shares, rather  than into alternatives  such as worker  self-managed  firms 
or cooperatives. Worker-managed  firms  (except for small-scale,  labor- 
intensive  operations)  put workers  at excessive risk and  cut the firms  off 
from the capital markets, because outside investors know that the 
workers  can vote to pay themselves higher  wages out of the company's 
profits. 
The government  must devise mechanisms that are rapid, but also 
transparent,  for selling the enterprises, or transferring  them free of 
charge, to the private  sector. Shares  can be sold to the public directly, 
transferred  directly  (for  example,  with a portion  of each enterprise  given 
to the workers  or other stakeholders  in the enterprise),  or transferred  to 
holding companies or mutual funds, which in turn would be sold or 
transferred  to the public. Other arrangements,  such as joint ventures 
and mergers  with private  firms, should also be used. As in many other 
countries,  ranging  from  South Korea  to Switzerland,  Poland  will almost 
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of state enterprises.  To the extent that foreigners  become owners, the 
firms  should  be sold for cash, or foreign  equity, rather  than  in a swap  for 
Poland's  debt, because the government  needs the cash and should seek 
more  direct  ways to achieve debt relief. 
Unlike the British model of privatization,  it is not urgent that 100 
percent  of the shares  of an  enterprise  be sold or transferred.  Some shares 
can remain  with the Treasury. Several countries in Western Europe 
have shown that an acceptable  level of efficiency and financial  respon- 
sibility  can  be obtained  in  a mixed  enterprise,  part  public  and  part  private. 
Because the capacity of the government to  sell a large number of 
enterprises  might  be limited,  and  because direct  transfers  of shares  may 
be limited  for  budgetary  or other  reasons, the partial  approach  may  allow 
for a greater  number  of firms  to enter  the process. 
The standard  method  for privatization  in the Western  countries has 
been the public offering  of shares of state enterprises. The process is 
time-consuming  even in a country in which capital markets  exist, and 
will prove to be even harder  in Poland  and the rest of Eastern Europe, 
given the fundamental  difficulties of  valuation and the absence of 
widespread  secondary  markets  for trading  in equities. There is also the 
problem  that the financial  assets of households are very limited. This 
last problem  can be partly  overcome if the government  lends the public 
part  of the money needed  for the share  purchases.58 
Many  schemes have been suggested  for the direct  transfer  of shares, 
as a way to speed the process of privatization  and to overcome the 
limited  financial  wealth of the private  sector. One proposal  has been to 
issue to the general  public, free of charge, a large number  of vouchers 
that could then be used to bid for firms  put up for auction.59  Another 
proposal has been to put the shares of enterprises in a few holding 
companies,  with the shares  of the holding  companies  in turn  distributed 
58. This lending  could be made  internally  to the firm  being  privatized,  or externally. 
In the former  case, the government  would sell a leveraged  firm,  in which the enterprise 
would  owe part  of its income stream  to the government,  in order  to reduce  the value of 
equity  that  the private  sector must purchase  out of its own resources.  In the latter  case, 
the  government  could  allow  banks  to make  equity  loans  to the public,  or even to undertake 
purchases  of shares  on their  own account,  as in the case of German  banks. 
59. Such a procedure would be extremely complex logistically, and would not 
overcome  the profound  problems  of valuation.  Moreover,  there would  be little to assure 
that  effective  management  for  the enterprises  would  be developed,  as the initial  ownership 
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to the public. There is concern, however, that such a process could 
actually  lead to a recentralization  of enormous  economic power in the 
hands  of a few institutions. 
A third proposal has been to begin the privatization  process by 
distributing  part  of the shares  of each enterprise  to various  stakeholders 
in the enterprise,  such  as workers,  state  banks,  and  the local government 
in the region where the enterprise  resides. The distribution  of shares 
would be according to a common formula worked out in a political 
compromise.  It seems clear to us that  any transfer  program  that  will win 
widespread  political  assent must  indeed  involve at least a partial  transfer 
to stakeholders,  as in this third  proposal, rather  than simply a transfer 
of ownership  directly  to households. 
In view of the profound  logistical and financial  problems  that would 
face the sale of thousands  of enterprises  through  public offerings, it is 
likely  that  at  least some  direct  transfer  of shares  will  have  to be envisaged. 
In such a case, it is important  to remember  that  the Treasury  now relies 
on the income stream  of the enterprises  as a major  form of revenue, so 
that  any transfer  of shares  must  be offset by another  form  of revenue  for 
the government.  One possibility is that part of the annual  income flow 
from the enterprise to the government would be converted from a 
"dividend" into a fixed bond. In effect, the government  would sell a 
leveraged  firm,  and  become a rentier  rather  than  a capitalist. 
In the end, privatization  should probably be carried out by many 
means. The pace must  be rapid,  but not reckless, in order  to achieve the 
basic objective of private  ownership.  But at the same time privatization 
should be carried  out in a way that is fair, that raises the chances for 
effective management, that protects the Treasury, and that guards 
against the inadvertent  creation of new concentrations of enormous 
political  and  economic power in the society. 
Other Structural Changes 
Many enterprises  will remain  in the state sector for a considerable 
time. For these firms, the government  must oversee the work of enter- 
prise restructuring,  including  horizontal  and vertical divestitures, and 
must encourage  new commercial  and technical relations  with Western 
firms.  Massive management  assistance will probably  be needed to help 
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absence of excess demand  and cheap credits. Without  such assistance, 
many enterprises will perform poorly, deepening Poland's recession 
unnecessarily,  and some potentially  viable enterprises  may be forced 
into bankruptcy. 
Poland must also promote its private sector. With state enterprise 
continuing  to dominate  the economy and  enjoying  favored  access in the 
state-owned  banking  system, special attention  must be given to ensure 
that  private  firms,  especially small-scale  firms,  have a chance of gaining 
a foothold. It is probably  worthwhile  for the government  to encourage 
the formation of financial institutions catering to the needs of small 
businesses. As the most recent data show, the private  sector has so far 
been unable  to tap credit  from  the state banks, holding  just $120  million 
of total  loans from  the entire  banking  system (a minuscule  2.7 percent  of 
the total credit of the banking  system). Promotion  of the private sector 
must  also include  rapid  progress  in the privatization  program  now being 
designed. 
Finally,  Poland  must  press  for  a reduction  of its external  indebtedness. 
While  cash flow relief  from debt service has been forthcoming  from the 
West, a deep and permanent  reduction  in the external debt burden  is 
indispensable  to Poland's  economic  long-term  recovery. The successful 
transformation  of the economy will require  a climate  in which large  and 
sustained  flows  of private  investment  can  be amassed.  Poland's  economy 
clearly holds the potential  for highly favorable  rates of return  on new 
investment, especially for exports to Western Europe. Nonetheless, 
Poland's  debt overhang  makes the returns  on these investments  uncer- 
tain  and  frustrates  the needed transformation.60 
Hopes and Fears for Long-term Change 
On  purely  economic  grounds,  there  are  profound  reasons  for  optimism 
in the long term. In view of Poland's  human  capital, natural  resources, 
60. Owing  to the  prevalence  of debt  to  official  creditors,  the  reduction  of the  commercial 
bank debt burden  under the Brady Plan would not be sufficient  to provide a lasting 
resolution  of Poland's  debt problem.  Poland  will also need a reduction  of official  indebt- 
edness. An important  precedent  for Poland, in light of the fact that West Germany  is 
Poland's  largest  creditor,  is the London  Agreement  of 1953,  in which the United States 
and  other  creditor  governments  granted  favorable  repayment  terms  on German  debt that 
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physical capital, geographic proximity to  Western Europe, and its 
prospects for increased economic and political harmonization  with 
Western  Europe, there is every reason to believe that Poland  should  be 
able to narrow decisively the gap in living standards  with Western 
Europe. There is simply no reason why a country with Poland's re- 
sources, human  and  physical, should  remain  stuck at real income levels 
half, or below half, those of the poorest countries  in Western  Europe. 
The gap in living standards should narrow as a direct result of 
institutional  and political harmonization  with Western  Europe. We do 
not need to believe in the strong  theorems  of factor  price  equalization  to 
recognize that an opening of free trade with Western Europe should 
increase  the demand  for Poland's  skilled  workers,  who are now earning 
(at around  $1 an hour)  about  one-tenth  to one-fifteenth  of what compar- 
ably skilled  workers  earnjust  500  miles  to the west. The  approach  toward 
factor price equalization  can arise both through  trade and inflows of 
capital,  as firms  set up production  operations  in Poland  for the purposes 
of exporting  to the Western  European  markets. 
And yet the happy picture  of a steady growth in living standards  at 
higher  rates than in Western  Europe, and so a steady narrowing  of the 
income differential,  while realistic enough economically, can still be 
frustrated  politically. Few economists would doubt the picture  for the 
eastern part  of a unified  Germany,  since internal  political  problems  are 
very unlikely to get in the way of a sharp rise in East German  living 
standards  (even aside from the direct equalization  coming from labor 
mobility).  But  in Poland,  and  perhaps  even more  in other  parts  of Eastern 
Europe,  the political  barriers  could remain  severe. 
The short-run  costs of the move to a market  economy may well lead 
to a rise of populism,  protectionism,  and a prolonged  macroeconomic 
crisis. The decades-long agony of Argentina is proof enough that a 
country can get trapped  in a seemingly  endless political stalemate  that 
blocks effective restructuring  of the economy. Ironically, pressure to 
opt for an "easy" route can come from economists and policymakers 
who, naively  judging  the official  data, believe that  the short-run  costs of 
reform  are excessive and therefore  support  short-run  melioratives  that 
block long-term  solutions. 
The West too has a vital, and so far unfulfilled,  role to play in seeing 
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assistance and long-run debt relief for Poland, Hungary, and other 
heavily indebted  countries  in the region,  the chances for a fresh start  for 
these countries  would  be enormously  magnified.  A bold commitment  of 
help from the West would help to spur  a bold commitment  to reform  in 
the East. And the combination  could help to fulfill the hopes of the 
democratic  revolution  of 1989. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stanley Fischer: David Lipton  and Jeffrey Sachs have produced  a fine 
paper,  a work of persuasion  that  is nonetheless  fully professional.  They 
aim  to persuade  us that  the  first,  stabilization,  stage  of the Polish  program 
was well executed and is causing  less pain than might  appear  from the 
reported data, for example that industrial  output in the state-owned 
sector is down 30 percent. Despite its title, the paper provides less 
information  on the second, structural  transformation,  phase of the 
program.  That  is both because less is known  about  what should  be done 
and  because at the time the paper  was written,  the stabilization  was only 
three months  old-and  first  things  come first. 
Because I agree with the paper's basic message, my comments will 
mainly  supplement  the analysis  and  arguments  of the paper.  Sequencing 
is the first issue to be faced in planning  the reform process. For an 
economy facing  hyperinflation,  as Poland  did  at the end of 1989,  the first 
step has to be macroeconomic  stabilization.  The structural  measures 
come next, with transformation  of the industrial  structure, including 
ownership,  the prime  goal. 
In the macroeconomic  stabilization  phase, it was necessary for the 
government  to reduce  its budget  deficit,  mainly  by cutting  subsidies,  and 
for the central bank to plug gaps in the credit system-that  is, to stop 
providing credit directly or indirectly to  enterprises. Equiv'alently, 
enterprise  budget  constraints  had  to be hardened.  Short-run  success was 
achieved in both respects. But because the government  has not yet had 
to confront  the tough  issues of unemployment  and  plant  closings, we do 
not know how fully the provision  of credit  is under  control. 
Both the Yugoslav and Polish stabilizations  of late 1989  suggest that 
it is possible to plug  money-creating  gaps in the credit  system even in an 
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economy with  nonprivate  firms  and  an underdeveloped  banking  system. 
All it takes is a tough government.  It will take continued  toughness to 
keep the gaps  from  reappearing  and maintain  low inflation. 
The crucial  element  in the rapid  reduction  of inflation  was the nominal 
exchange rate peg. It was also crucial that the initial  exchange rate be 
heavily overdevalued  relative  to its long-run  real  equilibrium  level. This 
the government  achieved by setting  the price of foreign  exchange close 
to its black  market  level, which, being  essentially  an  asset price  reflecting 
the almost  total  absence of domestic stores of value, was high  in relative 
purchasing  power terms. The undervalued  currency  was essential both 
to provide  incentives  for exports  and  to leave room  for the upward  wage 
and price adjustments  that were bound to take place in the first few 
months  of the stabilization. 
Lipton  and  Sachs seem to imply  that  the exchange  rate  should  be kept 
fixed for a long period or forever. Commitment  to this goal would be a 
mistake. Fixing the exchange rate helps bring inflation  down rapidly, 
but the costs of overvaluation  are so high that the government  has to 
recognize  that it may at some point want to change  the exchange  rate- 
and it should therefore not stake its prestige on holding  the exchange 
rate  at its current  level forever or even for a long time. 
The paper emphasizes the convertibility  of the currency. That is of 
course current  account convertibility.  The emphasis tends to obscure 
the daring  nature  of the Polish government's  approach  to trade  reform. 
Whereas  other reforming  governments  have typically removed quotas 
and  reduced  tariffs  gradually,  over periods  of five to ten years, the Polish 
government  freed up imports  and  reduced  tariffs  overnight. 
The importance  of this change cannot be overemphasized, for it 
answers  the question  of how a reforming  and heavily distorted  socialist 
economy can move to an appropriate  price structure.  With  unrestricted 
current  account  convertibility-which requires  an  appropriate  exchange 
rate  and  absence  of trade  restrictions-the country  has  the  price  structure 
that  it needs to give the right  signals  for the reallocation  of resources. 
In  this  crucial  respect,  the  Polish  government  made  the  most  important 
structural  change  in the economy as part  of the first, stabilization,  phase 
of its adjustment  program.  This approach  can be useful for all the East 
European  economies. It would  be less useful  in the Soviet Union, which 
is much  more closed and which by virtue of its size will continue to be 
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The paper rightly  emphasizes the need for tight monetary  and fiscal 
policy. The mix matters  too, for the real interest  rate  problem  is already 
emerging.  High real interest  rates are inevitable  in the early stages of a 
stabilization  program. Ex ante real interest rates are also extremely 
difficult  to estimate at the early stages, as point-to-point  inflation  rates 
differ radically from inflation  rates calculated from monthly average 
price levels. Thus high  real interest  rates can and must be tolerated  for 
some months. But high  real interest  rates maintained  over a long period 
can bring economic distress even to firms that are only moderately 
indebted  and in otherwise  good shape. They also inhibit  the investment 
that  will  be necessary  as industry  restructures.  Continued  fiscal  tightness 
is essential if real  interest  rates  are  to be brought  down  gradually  without 
reviving  inflation. 
Lipton and Sachs emphasize  the need to deal with Poland's private 
and official  debts. The budget  and external  accounts are in good shape 
only on the presumption  that no interest  will be paid. Poland  is likely to 
get a Brady-type  deal to reduce its debts with the commercial  banks. 
But the bulk  of its debt is official,  and  the question  arises of whether  the 
official sector will go beyond conventional  Paris Club  reschedulings  to 
move to debt reduction. Unless Poland receives significant  interest 
capitalization  or debt reduction,  the debt will hamstring  Polish growth. 
Macroeconomic  stabilization  is dramatic  and reasonably  well under- 
stood. By introducing  current  account convertibility,  and by providing 
unemployment  benefits, the government has included important  ele- 
ments of the next, structural,  phase of reform  in the stabilization  phase. 
But stabilization  is only the first-and  much the easier-phase  in the 
Polish structural  adjustment  program.  The structural  transformation 
issues, with industrial  restructuring  and  privatization  as the centerpiece, 
are less well understood  and more  important. 
The Polish  government  has now to move ahead  on industrial  restruc- 
turing. This will undoubtedly  be a lengthy process, but that is all the 
more reason to begin as soon as possible. Management  of most firms 
will likely remain  with current  managers  even as the property  rights  in 
those firms are clarified. For political reasons, and out of a simple 
concern  for fairness, the government  will probably  decide to distribute 
ownership  claims on existing  firms  as widely and equally  as possible. A 
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eventually to an actual stock market, is being explored and could be 
adopted. 
Other  reforms  in the structural  transformation  process derive from 
the  centrality  of industrial  restructuring.  The  design  of the unemployment 
benefit scheme and other aspects of the social safety net have to be 
improved. Financial sector reform has to take place, perhaps in two 
stages, first  to provide  a simple  and  robust  banking  system by recapital- 
izing existing banks and improving their management, and later to 
introduce more sophisticated institutions. Housing sector reform is 
needed to permit  more labor mobility. Increases in agricultural  output 
are politically as well as economically essential if the people are to 
receive early  benefits  from  the reforms. 
Foreigners  can make a big difference, through  technical assistance 
and with financial resources. Foreign management  consultants and 
management  contracts  for firms, especially in the banking  system, can 
help upgrade management  methods fast.  Foreign direct investment 
brings  in both  foreign  capital  and  management,  but is likely  to remain  on 
a small scale until the ownership  of existing firms  is clarified  and until 
prices can be established  that will not leave the government  vulnerable 
to the charge that it has sold national assets off too cheaply. The 
international  financial  institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, and 
later the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, will 
provide money and expertise. And the Polish government welcomes 
both-to  the extent that it is being overwhelmed  by a deluge of foreign 
experts  and  delegations. 
How optimistic should anyone be at this stage? Early in the paper, 
Lipton  and  Sachs  compare  Poland  with  Latin  America.  That  comparison 
certainly  comes to mind  as one confronts  a stabilization  program  from 
near-hyperinflation,  based on a fixed exchange  rate, in an economy that 
has to be fundamentally  restructured.  The dangers  of backtracking  on 
the stabilization  are  there. Indeed,  those dangers  account  for the paper's 
puzzling optimistic bias, its apparent  understatement  of the costs of 
stabilization  and overstatement of the benefits of eliminating  excess 
demand  and ending  rationing.  Why the optimism?  Because the paper  is 
also directed  at a Polish audience:  there is a debate going on in Poland, 
with many  arguing  that the time has come to ease up, that the program 
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argument  is wrong. The program has brought a sharp reduction in 
inflation,  and it has brought  a start  of restructuring.  But much  more has 
to be done; the supply response that is the ultimate  goal of the reform 
will be slow and halting;  and setbacks are inevitable  in both the stabili- 
zation and  restructuring  processes. 
Nonetheless, it is realistic to be optimistic  for the longer term. The 
Polish  government  and  society know  what  they want-a  West European 
type of economy-and  in this respect differ from the Latin American 
countries  in which repeated  stabilization  attempts  have failed. They are 
determined  to open their economy to trade, foreign investment, and 
external expertise, and they have the world's largest market  on their 
doorstep. The longer-term  prospects for structural  transformation  are 
good. 
Janos Kornai: The policy proposals David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs 
advance in their  paper  will get no criticism  here. Sachs and I discussed 
these issues several  times, and  we are  in complete  agreement  on all  basic 
principles.  At this point, however, policy proposals have to be sold in 
Budapest, Prague, and Bucharest, not here. Therefore, this is  the 
occasion to step aside from  the role of adviser, educator,  and preacher, 
and to attempt  a prognosis. 
We must  be realistic. Even if we might  hope for certain  policies to be 
adopted  and for certain  outcomes to obtain, we must at the same time 
face their  actual  probabilities.  Let me briefly  discuss four such probabil- 
ities: the probability  of there  being  a strong  government,  the probability 
of comprehensive  reform,  the probability  of a new bourgeoisie  emerging, 
and  the probability  of better  management  of the state-owned  sector. 
At this moment, Poland is fortunate to have a strong government 
enjoying popular support. But although the nation thus far remains 
united behind the Solidarity  government,  it is difficult  to predict what 
will happen three or five years from now. East Germany's  difficulties 
might  be lessened, or might  at least differ  from  those of other  countries, 
given the special context of German  reunification.  But for the rest of 
Eastern  Europe,  strong  governments  with solid popular  support  are  just 
one possibility.  Just  as likely are  fragile  government  coalitions  based on 
a fragmented  political  base. There  is also a possibility  that  countries  will 
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(for  example,  nationalist-xenophobic  and  outward-oriented)  will  become 
entangled  in bitter  struggles. 
Lipton  and  Sachs  refer  to populist  opposition  to the measures  adopted 
in Poland. In all countries, this is likely to be a very strong  force. No 
matter what strategy of transition is chosen, there will have to be 
unpopular  measures,  and demagogues  will have an easy time gathering 
political  forces in order  to oppose them. 
This is the gloomy part of the political perspective. Immediately 
following  the revolutions  all East European  countries  knew a period  of 
euphoria and new hopes associated with the idea of free elections. 
However, that will all be behind us after a while, and then comes the 
more  difficult  phase of actual  policymaking. 
In this situation,  Western  advisers, visitors, and  governments  should 
suggest  and support  social cohesion, a degree of national  unity that can 
bear the painful  changes that are needed. Even if the normal  electoral 
process should  lead to the government  party  or coalition  being opposed 
by one or several opposition parties, it should be suggested to the 
opposition  that it not be destructive  or obstructionist  during  the period 
of transition;  otherwise, all changes  will fail. 
The political  background  is of crucial  importance  for the comprehen- 
sive policy discussed in Lipton and Sachs's paper  and known  variously 
as "one stroke," "big bang," or-as  in my own book, The Road  to a 
Free Economy-"surgery,"  a major  operation  on a patient  involving  a 
whole package  of measures. 
If the government  is committed, strong, and enjoys a solid national 
backing,  there is a good chance that such comprehensive  reforms  and 
measures, painful  but needed, will come to pass. But if the system is 
very fragile and the opposition powerful, populist, and kindled by 
demagoguery,  then it will become politically  unfeasible  to implement  a 
comprehensive  reform  surgery. 
The considered opinion of wise economists as to what is better- 
gradualism  or particular  kinds  of sequencing-will not be decisive. What 
will be decisive is the natural  way of making  political  decisions, and  that 
means putting difficult and painful decisions off Jor a while. These 
political  factors  mean  that  there  is a significant  probability  for permanent 
postponement  and partial solutions that will be bad for the country 
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The Hungarian  experience clearly shows the dangers  and negative 
effects of partial  changes. Hungary  has already  experienced  20 years of 
muddling  through  with such partial  changes. For instance, prices were 
never more than partially  liberalized. Yet a sequence of partial  price 
liberalization  measures  will never result  in a rational  price system, only 
in the fueling  of inflation.  Through  a price-wage-cost  spiral,  rising  prices 
in one segment of the economy induce cost and price increases in the 
others. These then call for additional  subsidies for the firms  and even 
whole sectors that were hurt by the cost-push effects. Under these 
circumstances,  partial  price increases draw other prices behind them, 
and the initial  effect of more  rational  relative  prices is washed away by 
the rise in the remainder  of prices. The final  outcome is the continuation 
of price distortions  at an ever higher  general  price level. 
In addition, partial  liberalization  of prices unaccompanied  by wage 
controls may also have very bad inflationary  effects. Finally, partial 
convertibility  without hard  budget constraints  on the firm  and without 
tight  monetary  control  may lead to a rush  for foreign  exchange, as state 
enterprises  want  to get as much  hard  currency  as possible  without  paying 
for the consequences. 
In conclusion, there is a high probability  of protracted,  half-hearted 
partial  reforms  that  may  cause much  harm.  Western  economists visiting 
East European countries for any reason should encourage bold and 
comprehensive  reforms,  knowing  that  there  will in any event be a strong 
natural  resistance  against  them  for political  reasons. 
The third issue is the potential for privatization.  The problem of 
privatization  should  be looked  upon  as a problem  of social  transformation 
and therefore  necessarily  as an evolutionary  process. It was possible to 
liquidate  the kulaks  in half a year, but it is impossible to recreate rich 
farmers  as quickly.  It cannot  be accomplished  in a "big bang." 
The question  then is where to put the emphasis?  I would  put it on the 
creation  of a new middle  class of small-  and medium-sized  businesses, 
on a process  of embourgeoisement  that  develops  genuine  Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs  with strong  incentives for innovation  and for the devel- 
opment  of their  property.  There  are  many  people  all  over Eastern  Europe 
who are willing to engage in private business and are, it would seem, 
able to do so. They need encouragement  and the removal  of remaining 
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of the bureaucratic  barriers  characteristic  of the old regime.  In addition, 
they need credit  to get them  going, that  is, initial  capital. 
Indeed, one of the shocking  numbers  in Lipton and Sachs's paper  is 
the amount  of credit given to the private sector. It is disastrously  low, 
2.7 percent  of the total credit supplied  by the banking  system. This fact 
alone shows that something  serious is missing, and that policymakers 
and  economists  focus in a one-sided  manner  on the problems  of the large 
state-owned  enterprises.  They are, of course, a very important  part of 
the situation. Yet people may be paying too little attention to the 
encouragement  of a new social structure  through  social transformation. 
This social transformation  took centuries  for those parts  of the world, 
including  Eastern Europe, that went through  this process. Right now, 
we are once more starting  almost from scratch, at least in the Soviet 
Union. Hungary  and Poland may be somewhat better off because the 
informal  private sector may have been more developed there than in 
some parts of the Soviet Union. For us the process will probably  not 
take  centuries  but, it is to be hoped, only years. Yet much  more  attention 
should  be paid  to speeding  it up. International  organizations  tend  to have 
a one-sided interest in the corporate sector and to neglect genuine, 
private,  visible entrepreneurs,  and helping  them  get started. 
Finally, a few comments concerning  the state-owned sector. There 
may be no good solution on how to manage the state-owned sector. 
Economists in Eastern Europe need to be convinced of this fact. We 
witness  a very strange  revival  of market  socialist  ideas  in  Eastern  Europe. 
When the communist party was still in power, the so-called reform 
communists  suggested  running  the economy on the basis of a combina- 
tion of public  ownership  with market  coordination.  This was the central 
idea of what one may call the communist  phase of market  socialism. In 
the Soviet Union, official  policy still adheres  to this goal. 
The experience of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland under Rakowski, 
and  Gorbachev's  perestroika  all show that  this goal is doomed  to failure. 
It will also fail in China,  where the successful part  of the reforms  is the 
privatization  of agriculture  and not the market socialization of state- 
owned  enterprises  in the manufacturing  sector. 
One has a strange  feeling of deja vu when people who are noncom- 
munists  or even anticommunists  get into power and think  that they can 
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are not communists  they will be able to run their central bank, their 
Ministry  of Finance, and  their state-owned  enterprises  efficiently.  They 
are sure to fail. In this respect, the present Polish experience is not 
conclusive because state-owned  enterprises  are being run  under  a state 
of emergency, based on a hard budget constraint enforced through 
extremely tight credit supplies. The genuine test of insolvent state- 
owned firms going out of business and being liquidated is  not yet 
furnished. Maybe Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton already know of 
instances when a state-owned  business has been finally closed down, 
but certainly  it is not being  done on a mass scale yet. 
I was told that one should never say in the United States that a 
problem  has no solution, yet there are certain problems  that have no 
solution,  one of them  being  the efficient  operation  of a large  state-owned 
sector. Of course, state-owned  firms  can be efficient if they are a very 
minor part of the economy and surrounded  by a large private sector. 
Perhaps  the Swiss railroads  are running  well, but even about  this it may 
perhaps  be better  to ask the Swiss. 
The second insoluble  problem  is that it is impossible  to privatize  in a 
"big bang." What  to conclude?  That  for a long time, inevitably,  a large 
part  of the economy, in particular  the gradually  shrinking,  but still  rather 
large  state-owned  sector, will run  inefficiently.  This fact of life must be 
taken into account. If everybody is knowledgeable  and  works together, 
then this period may be relatively short. But should these countries  be 
less fortunate  and  more  divided  politically,  then  the  period  of inefficiency 
may be very protracted.  It will be a relatively  painful  period  of gradual 
privatization  and of stop-and-go  tightening  or loosening of policies vis- 
a-vis the state-owned sector. And while passive observation of what 
goes on would certainly  be wrong, it seems that however energetically 
we  may act, we  cannot expect a quick, overnight solution of our 
problems. 
General Discussion 
Several  panelists  suggested  that  popular  resistance  to markets  is likely 
to emerge and worsen the prospect for successful reform in Eastern 
Europe.  Thomas  Juster  observed  that  even in the United States markets 
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that price increases resulting  from scarcity, as opposed to increased 
cost, are not fair. Furthermore,  serious inflation  makes  people perceive 
themselves to be worse off, even without a decline in their real wage. 
Both phenomena  are likely to be prominent  during  the introduction  of a 
market  economy.  Juster  was particularly  skeptical  that  consumers  would 
be content with rising  prices and declining  measured  real wages, com- 
pensated only by a decline in queuing  time. In a similar  vein, William 
Poole noted that as the economy of Poland is liberalized, successful 
entrepreneurs  will earn high incomes. He suspected that such incomes 
and the accumulation  of wealth by a small portion of the population 
would  be unpopular. 
Jeffrey Sachs cautioned  against overstating  the popular  resentment 
toward  price increases. When  food prices in Poland  jumped  in January, 
the public's anger was directed at the communist monopoly on food 
distribution.  In February,  the government  was finally  able to break up 
the monopoly,  a step they had  been unable  to take  before. Sachs  felt that 
realistic, explainable,  rational  steps could be taken at the beginning  of 
the reform  process without  fear of public  rejection. 
The de facto control  of Polish firms  by workers  led Charles  Schultze 
to doubt  that  decreases in employment  would be the primary  effect of a 
fall in demand.  Rather,  given the monopoly  power enjoyed by many of 
these firms,  the main  effect would be a rise in prices to make  up the lost 
revenue,  with  workers  left  underemployed.  Sachs  agreed  that  enterprises 
have  been essentially  labor-managed  since the imposition  of martial  law. 
It has become politically impossible to install professional managers 
with the power to make employment and investment decisions. He 
predicted  that  the first  real  test of the reform  process will be whether  the 
Poles actually  close enterprises.  He emphasized  that  fears of unemploy- 
ment  are  exaggerated.  Unemployment  started  out very low, and  the real 
question is whether the unemployment  rate will be allowed to rise 
enough.  As firms  come under  pressure,  they each appeal  for a bailout  to 
preserve  their  employment  level. 
Some  panelists  were more  optimistic.  Georges  de Menil  seconded  the 
authors' point that the Polish situation was better characterized as 
liberation  from an administration  of occupation than as an internal 
political  revolution. He added that the Polish Catholic Church  was a 
strong  unifyingfactor.  For  these reasons,  the  Polish  situation  was entirely 
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Panelists  offered  numerous  suggestions  about  the pace and  technique 
of reform.  Charles  Holt, noting  the severe budget  problems, suggested 
gradually  phasing  in the safety net as government  support  for industries 
is phased out. Joseph Stiglitz  was concerned  that entrepreneurs  would 
hesitate to make investments if they feared that reforms would be 
reversed by later administrations.  He found some lessons in Margaret 
Thatcher's privatization  of certain British enterprises, which appears 
irreversible. William Poole emphasized that if privatization  did not 
proceed with a sense of urgency, it would take much  too long, allowing 
problems  to be created and opportunities  to be lost. He argued  that the 
government  should  be prepared  to sell at a discount  to get the enterprises 
into  the private  sector  quickly.  Stiglitz,  on the other  hand,  argued  against 
a "giveaway," stressing  the importance  of giving proper  signals about 
profitability  of firms. Peter Kenen also expressed reservations about 
rapid  privatization  on the grounds  that worrying  too much about effi- 
ciency would  add  political  roadblocks  to more  urgent  reform.  Recogniz- 
ing that insufficient  private  wealth is one possible obstacle to privatiza- 
tion, Franco  Modigliani  suggested  the state sell off only a fraction  of an 
enterprise  but leave all management  to ownership. 
William  Branson  justified  government  loans to finance  consumption 
during  the transition  to a market  economy on the grounds  that reforms 
will be costly for  the current  generation  and  will benefit  later  generations. 
There  was general  agreement  that  opening  the economy to the rest of 
the world is an important  ingredient  of successful reform.  A number  of 
comments were made about the impact of trade and capital mobility. 
John Williamson  agreed that the desire to "import" a relative price 
structure  provided  an  extra  argument  in  favor  of a  fixed  nominal  exchange 
rate, but  argued  that  one still needed  to ask the standard  questions  about 
whether  there  would  be sufficient  internal  price  flexibility  in the medium 
term to avoid overvaluation  developing  through  inflation  inertia. Con- 
versely, he pointed  out that an undervalued  exchange rate would result 
in upward pressure on prices. William  Branson pointed out that the 
extent to which the Polish and world financial  markets  were intercon- 
nected would have an important  bearing  upon the persistence of high 
real interest rates in Poland, and that therefore the way the capital 
account  exchange  rate  was handled  could be crucial  to reform. 
Stiglitz  questioned  whether  the larger  economies of the Soviet Union 
and  China  would  be able to benefit  from  foreign  competition  and  foreign David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs  145 
prices. Kenen replied that even in the continental Soviet economy, 
opening  the  foreign  sector  may  be the most  effective  way to move quickly 
on price reform and liberalization. William Brainard  observed that 
although introducing  world competition was desirable, world prices 
might not be the best guide for domestic allocation of resources. For 
example, world prices include capital charges that are not likely to be 
correct  for the current  Polish economy. 
Two questions  arose about  data. Juster  called into question  the view 
that  past data on Eastern  European  economies have overstated  growth 
rates. For the growth  rates  to be incorrect,  he reasoned, it is not enough 
that the data be biased; they must be becoming more biased. Brainard 
was curious about what had become of the revenue induced  by the 30 
percent  decline  in  real  wages. Sachs  replied  that  in  the past, black  market 
prices  were much  higher  than  official  prices  and  now they are  lower than 
the official prices; thus, transaction  prices have risen much less than 
official prices. He also indicated  that the additional  revenue has gone 
toward a reduction in the inflation tax and to some extent toward 
increased  profits  within  the firms. 146  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
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